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THE RACIAL ORIGINS OF MODERN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
Michael J. Klarman* 
The constitutional law of state criminal procedure was born be­
tween the First and Second World Wars. Prior to 1920, the Supreme 
Court had upset the results of the state criminal justice system in just a 
handful of cases, all involving race discrimination in jury selection.1 By 
1940, however, the Court had interpreted the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate state criminal convictions in 
a wide variety of settings: mob-dominated trials, violation of the right 
to counsel, coerced confessions, financially-biased judges, and know­
ingly perjured testimony by prosecution witnesses.2 In addition, the 
Court had broadened its earlier decisions forbidding race discrimina­
tion in jury selection in ways that made it practically as well as theo­
retically possible to establish equal protection violations in that con­
text. 3 
Altogether, the Supreme Court decided six landmark state crimi­
nal procedure cases during the interwar period. Four of these cases in­
volved black defendants from southern states. This Article contends 
that the linkage between the birth of modern criminal procedure and 
southern black defendants is no fortuity. For the Court to assume the 
function of superintending the state criminal process required a depar­
ture from a century and a half of tradition and legal precedent, both 
grounded in federalism concerns. The Justices were not prepared to 
embark on such a novel enterprise in cases of marginal unfairness -
where the police had interrogated a suspect a bit too vigorously or 
permitted defense counsel a little less time than optimal for preparing 
a case. On the contrary, the Court was willing to take this leap only 
when confronted with cases in which defendants were brutally tor­
tured into confessing or the appointment of defense counsel in a capi-
* James Monroe Professor, University of Virginia School of Law. B.A. 1980, M.A. 1980, 
University of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1983, Stanford University; D.Phil. 1988, Oxford University 
- Ed. Thanks to Pam Karlan, Mike Seidman, and Bill Stuntz for comments on an earlier 
draft. Andrew Schroeder and Cecelia Walthall provided valuable research assistance. 
1. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904); Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900); 
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
2. See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (coerced confessions); Mooney v. 
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (per curiam) (perjury); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) 
(right to counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (financially biased judge); Moore v. 
Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (mob-dominated trial). 
3. See Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
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tal case was a complete sham. Such flagrant injustiCes were not fre­
quent occurrences in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s -
except in the South, in cases involving black defendants charged with 
serious interracial crimes, usually rape or murder. 
Part I of this Article makes three related points about these egre­
gious exemplars of Jim Crow justice, which provided the occasion for 
the birth of modem criminal procedure. First, the southern state ap­
pellate courts and the United States Supreme Court were operating on 
the basis of different paradigms when they evaluated the fairness of 
these criminal trials. For the southern courts, the simple fact that these 
defendants enjoyed the formalities of a criminal trial, rather than be­
ing lynched, represented a significant advance over what likely would 
have transpired in the pre-World War I era. For the United States 
Supreme Court, on the other hand, criminal trials were supposed to be 
about adjudicating guilt or innocence, not simply avoiding a lynching. 
Second, because these southern criminal trials were so egregiously un­
fair, public opinion in the nation generally supported the Supreme 
Court's interventions. Thus, these early criminal procedure cases 
hardly represent the sort of countermajoritarian judicial decision­
making one often associates with landmark criminal procedure deci­
sions such as Mapp or Miranda.4 Third and finally, it is possible that 
the southern state courts themselves would have intervened to rectify 
the obvious injustices involved in these cases had the circumstances 
been a little different. Southern courts in the post-World War I period 
were becoming more committed to norms of procedural fairness, even 
in cases involving black defendants charged with serious interracial 
crimes. Yet, in cases that aroused outside criticism of the South or that 
posed broader challenges to the system of white supremacy, the 
southern state courts regressed. Cases that might never have reached 
the United States Supreme Court a decade or two earlier slipped 
through the state system uncorrected, thus providing the occasion for 
landmark criminal procedure rulings. 
Part II evaluates the impact of these Supreme Court decisions, in 
terms of both the precise issues involved (e.g., black service on juries) 
and the general treatment of blacks in the southern criminal justice 
system. It turns out that none of these rulings had a very significant di­
rect impact on Jim Crow justice. For example, few blacks sat on 
southern juries as a result of Norris v. Alabama, and black defendants 
continued to be tortured into confessing, notwithstanding Brown v. 
Mississippi. This Part explores some of the factors that explain the 
general failure of these Supreme Court decisions to affect the actual 
treatment of black criminal defendants in the South. Yet, Court deci­
sions also can have more intangible consequences. This Part suggests 
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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that these criminal procedure rulings may have indirectly contributed 
to the modern civil rights movement by educating blacks about their 
rights, mobilizing protest in the black community, and rallying support 
among sympathetic whites who were horrified by revelations of Jim 
Crow practices at their worst. 
Part III connects these criminal procedure decisions to broader 
themes in constitutional and civil rights history, identifying some ten­
tative lessons regarding the nature and consequences of Supreme 
Court constitutional decisionmaking and the dynamics through which 
American race relations have changed over time. 
I. FOUR LANDMARK CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 
Four of the landmark criminal procedure cases of the interwar pe­
riod involved southern black criminal defendants convicted and sen­
tenced to death after egregiously unfair trials. In Moore v. Dempsey,5 
the Supreme Court interpreted the Due Process Clause of the Four­
teenth Amendment to forbid criminal convictions obtained through 
mob-dominated trials. In Powell v. Alabama,6 the Court ruled that the 
Due Process Clause requires state appointment of counsel in capital 
cases and overturned convictions where defense counsel had been ap­
pointed the morning of trial. In Norris v. Alabama,7 the Court re­
versed a conviction under the Equal Protection Clause where blacks 
had been intentionally excluded from juries. To reach that result, the 
Court had to revise the critical "subconstitutional"8 rules that previ­
ously had made such claims nearly impossible to prove. In Brown v. 
Mississippi,9 the Court construed the Due Process Clause to forbid 
criminal convictions based on confessions extracted through torture. 
These four decisions arose from three distinct episodes. In Moore, 
six black defendants appealed death sentences imposed for a murder 
allegedly committed in connection with the infamous race riot in 
Phillips County, Arkansas in the fall of 1919.10 Phillips was a typical 
deep South cotton county with a black majority of approximately 
three-to-one. According to the local black community, the cause of the 
5. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). 
6. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
7. 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
8. By "subconstitutional" rules, I mean not the substantive liability standards, but rather 
the all-important rules bearing on standards of proof, standards of appellate review, and ac­
cess to federal court. For a fuller discussion, see Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 
SUP. Cr. REV. 303, 376-78 [hereinafter Klarman, Plessy]. 
9. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
10. The most detailed treatment of Moore is RICHARD c. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT 
ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988) [hereinafter CORTNER, 
MOB]. A briefer description appears in O.A. Rogers, Jr., The Elaine Race Riots of 1919, 19 
ARK. HIST. Q. 142 (1960). 
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racial altercation that culminated in the Moore litigation was the bru­
tal suppression by whites of an effort by black sharecroppers after 
World War I to form a tenant farmers' union and to seek legal redress 
for their landlords' peonage practices. The white community, on the 
contrary, charged that the cause of the conflagration was a black con­
spiracy to murder white planters throughout the county. An initial al­
tercation in which whites shot into a black union meeting at a church 
and blacks returned the gunfire, killing a white man, quickly escalated 
into mayhem. Marauding whites, some of whom flocked to Phillips 
County from adjoining states and enjoyed the assistance of federal 
troops ostensibly employed to quell the disturbance, went on a ram­
page against blacks, tracking them down through the rural county, and 
killing (on one estimate) as many as 250 of them. Seventy-nine blacks 
(and no whites) were prosecuted as a result of the riot; twelve received 
the death penalty for murder; and six were involved in the appeal to 
the United States Supreme Court in Moore v. Dempsey. The Court re­
versed their convictions on the ground that mob-dominated trial pro­
ceedings violated the Due Process Clause. 
The second and third race-based criminal procedure cases of the 
interwar period, Powell v. Alabama and Norris v. Alabama, both arose 
out of the famous Scottsboro Boys episode.11 Nine black youths, 
ranging in age from thirteen to twenty, impoverished, illiterate, and 
transient, were charged with raping two young white women, alleged 
to be prostitutes, on a freight train in northern Alabama in the spring 
of 1931. They were tried in a mob-dominated atmosphere, and eight of 
the defendants received the death penalty. The state supreme court 
reversed one of these death sentences on the ground that the defen­
dant was too young to be executed under state law and affirmed the 
other seven. The United States Supreme Court twice reversed the 
Scottsboro Boys' convictions - the first time on the ground that they 
had been denied the right to counsel, and the second time on the 
ground that blacks had been intentionally excluded from the grand 
jury that indicted them and the trial jury that convicted them. 
Fourth and finally, in Brown v. Mississippi the Supreme Court re­
versed the death sentences of three black sharecroppers convicted of 
murdering their white landlord.12 The principal evidence against the 
defendants was their own confessions, extracted through torture. The 
Supreme Court ruled that convictions so obtained violated the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
11 .  For extensive treatment of the Scottsboro Boys episode, see DAN T. CARTER, 
SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979), and JAMES 
GOODMAN, STORIES OF SCOTTSBORO (1994). 
12. The most complete treatment is RICHARD c. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO" CASE IN 
MISSISSIPPI: THE SUPREME COURT AND BROWN v. MISSISSIPPI (1986) [hereinafter 
CORTNER, BROWN]. 
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These four cases arose out of three quite similar episodes. South­
ern black defendants were charged with serious crimes against whites 
- either rape or murder. All three sets of defendants nearly were 
lynched before their cases could be brought to trial. In all three epi­
sodes, mobs comprised of hundreds or even thousands of whites sur­
rounded the courthouse during the trial, demanding that the defen­
dants be turned over for a swift execution. No change of venue was 
granted in these cases (except in the retrial of the Scottsboro Boys). 
Lynchings were avoided only through the presence of state militiamen 
armed with machine guns surrounding the courthouse. There was a se­
rious doubt - not just with the aid of historical hindsight, but at the 
time of the trial - as to whether any of the defendants was in fact 
guilty of the crime charged. The defendants in Moore and Brown were 
tortured into confessing. In all three cases, defense lawyers were ap­
pointed either the day of or the day preceding trial, with no adequate 
opportunity to consult with their clients, to interview witnesses, or to 
prepare a defense strategy. Trials took place quickly after the alleged 
crimes in order to avoid a lynching - less than a week afterward in 
Brown, twelve days in Powell, and a month in Moore. The trials were 
completed within a matter of hours (forty-five minutes in Moore) , and 
the juries, from which blacks were intentionally excluded in all three 
cases, deliberated for only a matter of minutes before imposing death 
sentences.13 
Prior to Moore v. Dempsey, the Supreme Court had reversed state 
criminal convictions on federal constitutional grounds in only a hand­
ful of cases involving race discrimination in jury selection.14 In a series 
of prior cases, the Court had denied that the Fourteenth Amendment 
converted the criminal procedure protections of the federal Bill of 
13. On Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, chs.1-2; GOODMAN, supra note 11,  
chs.1-2. On Moore, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.l. On Brown, see CORTNER, 
BROWN, supra note 12, chs.1-2. The Scottsboro Boys certainly were innocent of the crimes 
charged, as revealed in a subsequent recantation by one of the alleged victims. Their inno­
cence should have been reasonably clear at the trial both from the medical evidence and 
from the conflicting testimony of the prosecution's witnesses. See Brief for Petitioners at 28-
30, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98-100) [hereinafter Powell Petitioners' 
Brief], reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 291, 324-26 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard 
Casper eds., 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS]; CARTER, supra note 11, at 27-30, 227-
28, 232. The Brown defendants possibly were innocent, and the State surely lacked sufficient 
evidence to convict them apart from their tortured convictions. See Brown v. State, 161 So. 
465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting). The Moore defendants at most were guilty of 
being present when the lethal shots were fired, and not even clearly of this. See CORTNER, 
MOB, supra note 10, at 124-25. For a very similar case that never reached the Supreme 
Court, see Downer v. Dunaway, 53 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1931). For fascinating background on 
Downer, see Anne S. Emanuel, Lynching and the Law in Georgia Circa 1931: A Chapter in 
the Legal Career of Judge Elbert Tuttle, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 215 (1996). 
14. See cases cited supra note 1. 
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Rights into safeguards against state governments.15 Likewise, in prior 
state criminal cases, the Court had narrowly construed the Due Proc­
ess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which does explicitly con­
strain the states. That the Supreme Court would select cases like 
Moore, Powell, Norris, and Brown as the occasion for announcing 
novel interpretations of the Fourteenth Amendment is hardly sur­
prising. The identification of novel constitutional rights often takes 
place in cases that are appealing on their facts. Thus, for example, the 
constitutional right to privacy was first articulated in Griswold v. 
Connecticut,16 involving the right of married couples to use contracep­
tives in the privacy of their own homes, rather than in Roe v. Wade,11 
where the issue was a woman's right to abortion. Griswold required 
the Court to invalidate the laws of only two states and almost certainly 
was consistent with dominant national opinion. Roe, on the other 
hand, had the effect of invalidating the abortion laws of forty-six states 
and has been intensely controversial ever since.18 The race-related 
criminal procedure cases of the 1920s and 1930s were easy by almost 
any standard. Just as lynching was a convenient issue around which to 
mobilize national opinion politically, so was lynch law an easy issue 
around which to mobilize the Justices legally. Even a Court that 
evinced little sensitivity to the plight of blacks generally would be ap­
palled by these farcical trials of southern black defendants. It was one 
thing to segregate or disfranchise southern blacks.19 It was quite an­
other to railroad possibly innocent black defendants to the death pen­
alty through tortured confessions and mob-dominated trials. This was 
just one step removed from lynching; it was legal lynching. 
As already noted, none of these defendants was clearly guilty, and 
it is possible that none of them was in fact guilty. Yet, in southern 
criminal cases involving allegations of black-on-white murder or sex­
ual assault, factual guilt frequently was beside the point.20 In the South 
15. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908) (privilege against self­
incrimination); Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900) (right to a grand jury proceeding); 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884) (same). 
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
18. On Griswold and Roe and the general propensity of constitutional law to suppress 
outliers, see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 
82 VA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1996) [hereinafter Klarman, Civil Rights], and Michael J. Klarman, 
What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 145, 172-73 (1998). 
19. See Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (unanimously sustaining the constitu­
tionality of the white primary); Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927) (unanimously (albeit 
indirectly) sustaining the constitutionality of public school segregation). 
20. On mob-dominated trials not being concerned with determining factual guilt, see 
NEIL MCMILLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 206-
07 (1989); George C. Wright, By the Book: The Legal Executions of Kentucky Blacks, in 
UNDER SENTENCE OF DEATH: LYNCHING IN THE SOUTH 250, 251 (W. Fitzhugh Brundage 
ed., 1997) [hereinafter Wright, Legal Executions]; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 246. 
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during this period, the mere allegation by a white woman that she had 
been raped by a black man generally was the equivalent of convic­
tion.21 As a southern letter-writer candidly informed The Nation in de­
fending Alabama's performance with regard to Scottsboro, " [i]f a 
white woman is prepared to swear that a Negro either raped or at­
tempted to rape her, we see to it that the Negro is executed."22 The 
norms of white supremacy did not permit a jury of white men to be­
lieve a black man's word over a white woman's. The gender norms of 
the time and place did not allow defense counsel to closely interrogate 
a white woman about allegations involving sex. One southern newspa­
per observed in the context of a rape case around the time of 
Scottsboro that the honor of one white woman was more important 
than the life of a black man.23 Southern whites often defended 
lynchings in response to allegations of rape on the ground that south­
ern white women should not be forced to endure intolerable cross­
examination in a rape prosecution. Moreover, because most southern 
white men believed that black males secretly lusted after "their" 
women, rape allegations generally were credible to them. Similarly, in 
black-on-white murder cases that inflamed the passions of the com­
munity, such as Moore v. Dempsey or Brown v. Mississippi, "accusa­
tion [was] equivalent to condemnation."24 In such cases, the function 
of the trial was less to establish factual guilt or innocence than to pre­
empt a mob lynching. 
Indeed, the defendants in the four cases that reached the Supreme 
Court likely would have been lynched prior to World War I.25 The ze­
nith of lynchings in the American South came in the late 1880s and 
21. On rape cases, see RAY STANNARD BAKER, FOLLOWING THE COLOR LINE: 
AMERICAN NEGRO CITIZENSHIP IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 198-99 (Harper Torchbooks 
1964) (1908); CARTER, supra note 11 ,  at 133-35, 241; ARTHUR RAPER, THE TRAGEDY OF 
LYNCHING 50 (1933); Kathleen Atkinson Miller, The Ladies and the Lynchers: A Look at the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, 17 S. STUD. 221, 230 (1978); 
Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 257. 
22. John Gould Fletcher, Correspondence, Is This the Voice of the South?, 137 THE 
NATION 734 (1933). 
23. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 134 (citing BIRMINGHAM REP. , Apr. 1, 1933) . 
24. KELLY MILLER, RACE ADJUSTMENT: ESSAYS ON THE NEGRO IN AMERICA 79 
(1908) . 
25. For the claim that the Scottsboro Boys would have been lynched in an earlier era, 
see CARTER, supra note 11, at 105, 189. The rest of this paragraph is based on EDWARD L. 
AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH CENTURY 
AMERICAN SOUTH 238-55 (1984); BAKER, supra note 21, ch.9; Brundage, supra note 20; W. 
FITZHUGH BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING IN THE NEW SOUTH: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA, 1880-
1930 (1993) [hereinafter BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING); MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.7; 1 
GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN 
DEMOCRACY ch.27 (1944); RAPER, supra note 21, chs.1-3; GEORGE BROWN TINDALL, 
SOUTH CAROLINA NEGROES 1877-1900 ch.12 (1952); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL 
VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865-1940: LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE AND "LEGAL LYNCHINGS" 
(1990) [hereinafter WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE). 
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early 1890s, when well over a hundred were reported annually, and in 
some years over two hundred. Lynchings were primarily, though not 
exclusively, a southern phenomenon, and primarily, though not exclu­
sively, a racial phenomenon. Over time, lynchings outside of the South 
and lynchings of persons who were not black became increasingly rare. 
Lynchings were much more common in sparsely populated counties, 
and especially in those experiencing rapid population growth and a 
transient black population. Many more blacks were lynched in the 
deep South than in the upper South or the border states. Most 
lynchings were linked to allegations of crime, though, contrary to 
popular mythology, the crime was rape in only a fairly small percent­
age of cases (roughly 20% ). More often, the alleged crime was murder 
(nearly 40% of lynchings), though occasionally the offense was some­
thing much less serious, such as breach of racial etiquette or general 
uppityness. Some lynchings are best understood as the administration 
of populist justice, while others can only be interpreted as efforts to 
ensure black subordination. Prior to World War I, lynchings typically 
enjoyed the support of the local community. Efforts to prosecute even 
known lynchers were rare, and convictions were virtually nonexistent. 
Mass public lynchings in which hundreds or thousands of spectators 
attended, brought their children, and took home souvenirs from the 
victim's body were not uncommon during the peak period of 
lynchings. 
By the 1920s, however, the annual number of reported lynchings 
had declined dramatically. - from 187 .5 in the 1890s, to 92.5 in the 
1900s, to 61.9 in the 1910s, to 46.2 in the first half of the 1920s, and to 
16.8 in the second half of that decade.26 Many factors may explain this 
decline: the threat of federal anti-lynching legislation; the risk of state 
prosecution resulting from growing public repugnance toward 
lynchings; the diminishing insularity of the South attributable to better 
transportation and communication facilities; more professional law en­
forcement; better education; and perhaps the more settled nature of 
southern race relations, which rendered lynchings as a method of so­
cial control increasingly obsolete.27 Most importantly for present pur­
poses, the decline in lynchings probably also was dependent on their 
being replaced by quick trials that reliably produced guilty verdicts, 
26. See RAPER, supra note 21, at 26-27; see also 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: 
A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED 
PEOPLE, 1909-1920, at 210 (1967). 
27. On various explanations for the decline in lynchings, see BRUNDAGE, LYNCHING, 
supra note 25, at 209, 238; MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 565; GEORGE B. TINDALL, THE 
EMERGENCE OF THE NEW SOUTH 1913-1945, at 174, 554 (1967); Miller, supra note 21, at 
237; Todd E. Lewis, Mob Justice in the 'American Congo': 'Judge Lynch' in Arkansas During 
the Decade After World War I, 52 ARK. HIST. Q. 156 (1993). 
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death sentences, and rapid executions.28 Arkansas actually enacted a 
law designed to prevent lynchings by providing for a special term of 
court in cases of rape or other crimes likely to arouse the passions of 
the people; trial was to take place within ten days of the alleged 
crime.29 Defense counsel in cases like Moore, Brown, or Scottsboro 
generally refrained from requesting a continuance, since delaying trial 
only enhanced the chances of their clients being lynched.30 In all of 
these Supreme Court cases, and in many others that did not reach the 
Court, law enforcement officers gave explicit promises to prospective 
lynch mobs that black defendants would be quickly tried and executed 
if the mob desisted from its lynching efforts.31 Prosecutors sometimes 
appealed to juries on similar grounds, urging them to convict in order 
to reward the mob for its good behavior and thus to encourage similar 
restraint in the future.32 Opponents of leniency urged governors in 
such cases not to commute death sentences if they expected mobs to 
desist from lynching in future cases; some governors used this argu­
ment to justify allowing death sentences to stand.33 Incredibly, similar 
arguments were made even to appellate courts reviewing convictions 
from mob-dominated trials.34 
If all of this seems extraordinary to modern eyes, one must re­
member that for white southerners defending mob-dominated trials, 
the relevant comparison was to lynchings rather than to elaborate 
court proceedings accompanied by all the trappings of due process. 
Thus, a local newspaper warned in connection with a mob-dominated 
trial conducted contemporaneously with Scottsboro that challenging 
the conviction was "playing with fire," since a hasty trial was prefer­
able to a lynching and indeed was "a first step, and a very important 
one."35 Local newspapers frequently crowed with pride after a lynch-
28. On the replacement of lynchings with mob-dominated trials, see AYERS, supra note 
25, at 246; CARTER, supra note 11, at 115; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 206-17; Wright, Le­
gal Executions, supra note 20. 
29. For examples of "special sessions" to avoid lynchings, see Bettis v. State, 261 S.W. 46 
(Ark. 1924); CHARLES S. MANGUM, JR., THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 298 (1940); 
LAWRENCE D. RICE, THE NEGRO IN TEXAS 1874-1900, at 253 (1971); TINDALL, supra note 
25, at 252. 
30. See RAPER, supra note 21, at 46-47; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 229. 
31. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 88-89 (1923); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282, 285 
(Ga. 1914); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 3-4, 8; WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE, supra 
note 25, at 251, 255; Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 36-37, reprinted in 27 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 332-33. 
32. See, e.g., Cleveland v. State, 94 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 1936); Williams v. 
State, 84 So. 8 (Miss. 1919); Harris v. State, 50 So. 626 (Miss. 1909); Thompson v. State, 26 
S.W. 987 (Tex. Crim. App. 1894). 
33. See, e.g., Moore, 261 U.S. at 90; CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 101. 
34. See, e.g., Downer v. Dunaway, 1 F. Supp. 1001, 1003 (M.D. Ga. 1932). 
35. Editorial, Playing with Fire, FORUM (Washington, Ga.), June 25, 1931, quoted in 
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 246 n.161. 
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ing was averted and congratulated local citizens on the admirable self­
restraint they had demonstrated.36 White Alabamians seemed genu­
inely puzzled at outside criticism of their handling of the Scottsboro 
cases. Avoiding a lynching was "a genuine step forward,"37 and thus 
was deserving of commendation, not condemnation. The state su­
preme court lauded the speed of the Scottsboro Boys' trials as likely to 
instill greater respect for the law.38 A state member of the Commission 
on Interracial Cooperation ("CIC") thought it odd that Alabama 
should be criticized for delivering exactly what the CIC had been 
fighting so hard to accomplish - replacement of lynchings with trials. 
Several southern newspapers warned in connection with Scottsboro 
that if outsiders continued to assail Alabama after juries had returned 
guilty verdicts, then there would be little incentive to resist a lynching 
on future occasions.39 
In sum, the state-imposed death penalty in these cases was little 
more than a formalization of the lynching process. As a dissenting jus­
tice on the state supreme court in Brown v. Mississippi put it, the legal 
proceedings were simply a "fictitious continuation of the mob which 
originally instituted and engaged in the admitted tortures."40 The pur­
pose of a mob-dominated trial was simply to avoid a lynching, and the 
purpose of a lynching usually was to ensure black subordination rather 
than to punish guilt. Thus, the result of these trials was pretty much 
foreordained, since their purpose had little to do with establishing fac­
tual guilt or innocence. In the slim handful of cases where defendants 
in mob-dominated trials were acquitted, they often were shot dead by 
the mob before they could leave the courthouse.41 
Because these mob-dominated trials were more about preventing 
lynchings than reaching just verdicts, they presented appealing cases 
for the intervention of a legal tribunal that thought the purpose of 
criminal trials should be to determine factual guilt or innocence. The 
Supreme Court during the interwar period might have been reluctant 
to intervene in state criminal proceedings had the injustice been less 
manifest. A long, unbroken tradition, grounded in federalism con-
36. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 105-06; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 11 .  
37.  CARTER, supra note 11,  at 113. 
38. See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 211 (Ala. 1932). 
39. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 107, 111-13; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 55-57; 
Frank L. Owsley, Scottsboro: The Third Crusade, 1 AM. REV. 257, 285 (1933). 
40. 161 So. 465, 472 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting). 
41. See MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 208; see also ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, RACE AND 
DEMOCRACY: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN LOUISIANA 1915-1972, at 26-29 (1995). On 
rare occasions, lynch mobs actually constituted themselves into extralegal adjudicative bod­
ies, taking evidence and occasionally freeing a wrongly accused suspect. Thus, at the ex­
tremes, lynchings and legal lynchings converged into one another. On lynch mobs dispensing 
populist justice, see MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 226-27, 239-44; Wright, Legal Executions, 
supra note 20, at 252. 
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cems, restrained the federal courts from superintending state criminal 
trials. 
Indeed, just eight years prior to Moore the Court had declined to 
intervene in state criminal proceedings even on egregious facts.42 Leo 
Frank, the superintendent of an Atlanta pencil factory, was charged in 
1913 with the murder of a thirteen-year-old girl, Mary Phagan, who 
worked in the plant. The evidence presented against Frank at trial was 
suspect, and the leading modem authority on the case plausibly has 
concluded that Frank was innocent. Yet as a transplanted northerner, 
a Jew, and an industrialist, Frank represented everything that was 
alien to the South's still predominantly rural, agricultural, and Protes­
tant culture. Frank's arrest and charging unleashed a torrent of anti­
Semitism. Every day of his trial, a mob surrounding the courthouse 
could be heard screaming, "Hang the Jew!," through the ground floor 
courtroom's open windows. In the presence of the jury, the trial judge 
consulted with the chief of police and the colonel of the state militia 
on security measures. At the judge's initiative, neither Frank nor his 
lawyers were present when the jury returned its verdict, so as to avoid 
a lynching in the unlikely event of an acquittal or a mistrial. After 
Frank exhausted his state court appeals, he sought a writ of habeas 
corpus from the federal courts. The United States Supreme Court re­
jected his appeal in 1915, ruling that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment required only that the state criminal justice 
system afford him an opportunity to raise his claim of mob domination 
in some forum other than the court that allegedly was under mob in­
fluence. Since the state supreme court had considered and rejected 
Frank's claim, the Federal Constitution was satisfied. Invoking feder­
alism concerns, the Supreme Court declined to second guess the state 
appellate court's determination that the trial outcome had not been 
influenced by the mob surrounding the courthouse.43 Georgia's gover­
nor, after reviewing the evidence and concluding that Frank probably 
was innocent, commuted his sentence to life imprisonment. Frank was 
then seized by a mob from the state prison farm at Milledgeville and 
taken back to Marietta, where he was lynched. 
Eight years later, in Moore v. Dempsey, the Supreme Court or­
dered a federal district judge to conduct a hearing on whether the 
convictions of the Phillips County blacks were products of a mob­
dominated trial and thus were in violation of the Due Process Clause. 
Frank and Moore are not necessarily inconsistent. Justice Holmes's 
42. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915). The fullest account of the Frank case is 
LEONARD DINNERSTEIN, THE LEO FRANK CASE (1968); see also Nancy MacLean, Gender, 
Sexuality, and the Politics of Lynching: The Leo Frank Case Revisited, 78 J. AM. HIST. 917 
(1991); Appellant's Argument at 3-8, Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (No. 775) re­
printed in 17 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 476-81. 
43. Frank, 237 U.S. at 334-38. 
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majority opinion in Moore can be read in either of two ways; one is 
consistent with Frank, and the other is not. At one point, Holmes 
deems it irrelevant whether the state system provided adequate cor­
rective process if the federal court determines for itself that mob 
domination converted the trial into a farce.44 This is what Holmes had 
said in his dissent in Frank, and obviously is inconsistent with the ma­
jority opinion in that case. Yet at another point in his Moore opinion, 
Holmes states that the corrective process afforded these defendants by 
the Arkansas Supreme Court was flawed - a determination that 
would permit reversal even within the bounds set by Frank.45 The state 
supreme court in Moore apparently refused to make its own findings 
with regard to mob domination, noting that "no attempt is made [by 
appellants] to show that a fair and impartial trial was not had" and re­
fusing to conclude "that this must necessarily have been the case."46 
While the decisions may be technically consistent, it seems more 
likely that the Justices in Moore simply were more solicitous of the de­
fendants' rights. This apparent shift in disposition probably cannot be 
attributed to changes in the composition of the Court. If anything, per­
sonnel changes appeared disadvantageous to litigants seeking the 
Court's intervention against mob-dominated trials.47 One of the two 
dissenters in Frank, Charles Evan Hughes, had resigned from the 
Court in 1916 to run for president as the Republican Party's nominee. 
Moreover, prior to Moore, President Warren G. Harding had made 
several conservative appointments to the Court - William Howard 
Taft, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. One would not have pre-
44. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91-92 (1923). 
45. Id. at 91-92. 
46. Hicks v. State, 220 S.W. 308, 309-10 (Ark. 1920). Whether Moore is consistent with 
Frank has occasioned much historical debate. See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 420-21 
(1962); id. at 457-58 (Harlan, J., dissenting); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 185-88; Paul 
M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. 
L. REV. 441, 488-91 (1963); Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part II. Leo 
Frank Lives: Untangling the Historical Roots of Meaningful Habeas Corpus Review of State 
Convictions, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1467, 1530-35 (2000). Justice McReynolds, who dissented in 
Moore, certainly saw the two decisions as inconsistent. See Moore, 261 U.S. at 93-96 
(McReynolds, J., dissenting). For contemporary commentators viewing the decisions as in­
consistent, see Note, Mob-Domination of State Courts and Federal Review by Habeas Cor­
pus, 33 YALE L.J. 82 (1923); Note, Mob Domination of a Trial as a Violation of the Four­
teenth Amendment, 37 HARV. L. REV. 247 (1924) [hereinafter Harvard Note]. Naturally, 
appellants in Moore adhered to the contrary view. See Brief for the Appellants at 35-37, 40, 
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (No. 199), reprinted in 21 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, 
at 230-32, 235. 
The different outcomes also could be attributable to the more egregious facts of Moore. 
While Frank's trial was indeed mob dominated, he at least received a genuine defense in a 
trial lasting an entire month. In Moore, by way of contrast, defense lawyers were appointed 
the day before a trial that lasted just forty-five minutes. On the comparison between the 
quality of the defense in Frank and Moore, see Appellants' Brief at 35-37, Moore (No. 199), 
at 230-32. 
47. On personnel changes, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 144-46. 
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dieted that these Justices would jettison federalism restrictions on the 
Court's supervision of state criminal proceedings. 
Changes in the extralegal context constitute the most plausible ex­
planation for the seemingly inconsistent results in Frank and Moore. 
The nation, and the Court, likely would have taken a very different 
view of lynching (and, relatedly, lynch law) before and after World 
War I. Prior to the war, the NAACP had been largely unsuccessful at 
focusing national attention on lynching. President Theodore 
Roosevelt criticized lynchings but blamed them mainly on black 
criminals.48 President Taft refused to comment on lynchings because 
he thought them beyond the jurisdiction of the federal govemment.49 
President Woodrow Wilson repulsed repeated efforts to secure his 
condemnation of lynchings until after an alarming increase in their 
number during and after the war - from 36 in 1917 to 60 in 1918 to 76 
in 1919.50 This resurgence in lynchings paved the way for the 
NAACP's massive publicity campaign against lynching and in support 
of a federal anti-lynching statute. The widespread race riots during 
and after the war also helped focus national attention on problems of 
interracial violence and lawlessness.51 President Wilson finally was im­
pelled to condemn lynching in the summer of 1918.52 The NAACP 
printed and circulated fifty thousand copies of the president's state­
ment and in the spring of 1919 convened an anti-lynching conference 
that was endorsed by prominent political figures such as Charles 
Evans Hughes, Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer, and former Sec­
retary of State Elihu Root. 53 From that conference issued an NAACP 
address to the nation on lynching, signed by 130 prominent citizens, 
including former President Taft, who would become Chief Justice by 
the time of Moore. In a special message to Congress in April 1921, 
President Harding endorsed a federal anti-lynching bill, which had 
first been introduced in Congress in 1918 by Representative Leonidas 
Dyer of St. Louis. Early in 1922, just a year before Moore, the House 
of Representatives passed that legislation. The NAACP then submit­
ted memorials in support of the bill to the Senate; these had been en-
48. See Theodore Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress (1906), in 17 THE WORKS OF 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT 412, 420-25 (1925) ("The greatest existing cause of lynching is the 
perpetration, especially by black men, of the hideous crime of rape . . . .  "). 
49. See RICHARD B. SHERMAN, THE REPUBLICAN PARTY AND BLACK AMERICA: 
FROM MCKINLEY TO HOOVER, 1896-1933, at 97-98 (1973); ROBERT L. ZANGRANDO, THE 
NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950, at 26 (1980). 
50. On the number of lynchings, see ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 35. 
51. See KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 246; ZANGRANDO, supra note 49, at 38. 
52. See KELLOGG, supra note 26, at 227; SHERMAN, supra note 49, at 123-24. 
53. For the remainder of this paragraph on the NAACP's anti-lynching campaign, see 
KELLOGG, supra note 26, ch. 10; SHERMAN, supra note 49, ch.7; ZANGRANDO, supra note 
49, chs. 2-3. 
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dorsed by half of the nation's governors, mayors of many prominent 
cities, and leading church officials, state court judges, and college 
presidents. The Association also took out full-page ads in national 
newspapers that proclaimed lynching "The Shame of America." This 
extensive lobbying campaign came to naught, as the Dyer bill was fili­
bustered to death in the Senate. Yet the vast majority of Republican 
congressmen had supported federal anti-lynching legislation in 1922, a 
sentiment likely shared in 1923 (the year of Moore) by the majority of 
Supreme Court Justices, who also were Republicans. Just as Republi­
can congressmen were motivated by the recent epidemic of anti-black 
violence to condemn lynching, so may similarly-minded Supreme 
Court Justices have been prompted to take action against lynching's 
close cousin, mob-dominated trials.54 
The Scottsboro cases that reached the Supreme Court, first in 1932 
and then again in 1935, presented the Justices with a similarly appeal­
ing set of facts in which to make new constitutional law governing 
state criminal procedure.55 Nine black youngsters were charged with 
the rape of two white women; eight of them received the death pen­
alty. The trials were conducted in a mob atmosphere. Defense counsel 
was appointed the morning of the trials. The trial record raised sub­
stantial doubts as to the defendants' factual guilt. The lawyers for the 
Scottsboro Boys raised three distinct constitutional claims in their first 
appeal to the Supreme Court, Powell v. Alabama: mob domination of 
the trial, in violation of the Due Process Clause; intentional exclusion 
of blacks from the grand and petit juries, in violation of the Equal Pro­
tection Clause; and denial of the right to counsel under the Due Proc­
ess Clause.56 The Court reversed the defendants' convictions on the 
last of these proffered grounds, declining to reach the other two. It is 
impossible to know why the Justices chose this basis for their decision. 
Either of the other two grounds would have required the creation of 
less new law. Moore already had established a due process right to a 
criminal trial free of mob domination, and a consistent line of cases 
dating back to Strauder v. West Virginia57 in 1879 had established that 
blacks could not be excluded from juries because of their race. 
(Around the turn of the century, however, the Court had evolved sub­
constitutional rules that made such discrimination virtually impossible 
to prove. )58 
54. On the connection between Moore and the federal anti-lynching bill, see Harvard 
Note, supra note 46, at 250. 
55. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 50. 
56. See Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 3-4, 34-62, reprinted in 27 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 299-300, 330-58. 
57. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
58. See, e.g., Franklin v. South Carolina, 218 U.S. 161 (1910); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 
278 (1909); Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316 (1906); Brownfeld v. South Carolina, 189 U.S. 426 
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Possibly the Justices in Powell chose the ground for decision that 
they thought would prove least controversial, even though it required 
the creation of the most new law.59 Invalidating Ozie Powell's convic­
tion on the basis of mob domination would have required an extension 
of Moore, since Powell's trial was not quite so farcical as that of the 
Phillips County defendants: Powell received a genuine defense; his 
trial lasted for several hours (not forty-five minutes); his jury deliber­
ated more than the five minutes in Moore; his case did not raise the 
broader implications of the Phillips County race riot; and he had not 
been tortured into confessing.60 Thus, for the Court in Powell to have 
reversed the convictions on the basis of Moore might have required 
some basic alterations in the administration of Jim Crow justice in 
high profile cases involving black-on-white crime. Moreover, the 
author of Powell, Justice Sutherland, had been one of the two dissent­
ers in Moore, and thus was an unlikely candidate for extending that 
decision. Similarly, to invalidate Powell's conviction on the basis of 
race discrimination in jury selection would have been far more contro­
versial among white southerners, because the perpetuation of white 
supremacy within the legal system depended substantially on the pres­
ervation of all-white juries. Overturning Powell's conviction on the 
ground that he had been denied the right to counsel, on the other 
hand, was unlikely to affect either the outcome of his retrial or, more 
generally, the nature of Jim Crow justice.61 
While prior to Powell the Supreme Court never had ruled that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment required that 
states respect the right to counsel in criminal trials, neither had it ever 
rejected that position.62 Moreover, every state court that had con­
fronted the issue had, on its own initiative, guaranteed state-appointed 
(1903); Tarrance v. Florida, 188 U.S. 519 (1903). For discussion of the Plessy-era jury cases, 
see Klarman, Plessy, supra note 8, at 376-78; Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction and 
Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 
1462-76 (1983). 
59. On the oddity of the Powell Court's reaching out to decide a new legal issue, see 
BERNARD H. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE NEGRO SINCE 1920, at 69 
(1946). 
60. For the argument that the mob-domination claim was stronger in Moore, see Brief 
for Respondent at 27-28, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (Nos. 98-100), reprinted in 
27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 399-400. 
61. For contemporary criticism of the Court for ducking more significant issues and "in­
structing" Alabama on how to properly execute the Scottsboro Boys, see CARTER, supra 
note 11, at 163-64; 1 HARVARD SITKOFF, A NEW DEAL FOR BLACKS 224-25 (1978). For the 
claim that the right-to-counsel ground would incite the least southern resentment, see Alfred 
J. Cilella & Irwin J. Kaplan, Note, Discrimination Against Negroes in Jury Service, 29 ILL. L. 
REV. 498, 505-06 (1934). 
62. As of 1932, the only Bill of Rights protections that had been held applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment were the Fifth Amendment right to just compen­
sation for takings of property and the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. See 
Otto M. Bowman, Comment, 12 OR. L. REV. 227, 232 n.32 (1933). 
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counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases.63 Powell, of course, 
had received a court-appointed lawyer. He made two arguments as to 
why this appointment failed to satisfy federal constitutional standards. 
First, the State had not permitted him adequate opportunity to hire 
counsel of his own choice. Second, the court appointment was inade­
quate because it had been made the morning of the trial, and thus de­
fense counsel was denied an adequate opportunity to consult with cli­
ents, interview witnesses, and prepare a defense.64 
The Alabama Supreme Court in Powell deemed this last minute 
appointment of counsel sufficient to satisfy the state constitutional re­
quirement of a court-appointed lawyer in capital cases. The United 
States Supreme Court has no authority to review state court interpre­
tations of state law. Thus the Court, if it was to reverse Powell's con­
viction, had to construe the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect the right to counsel in capital cases. As noted 
earlier,65 the Justices seem least reluctant to expand constitutional 
rights when doing so involves simply holding a few outlier states to the 
norm already espoused by the vast majority. The right to state­
appointed counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases had not 
been rejected in any state. Indeed, one reason why state courts had 
not yet considered whether the Federal Due Process Clause guaran­
teed such a right is that they all had interpreted their state constitu­
tions to do so. 
Once the Court had determined that the Due Process Clause pre­
vented the states from denying capital defendants the right to counsel, 
reversing Powell's conviction was easy. First, Powell had been denied 
the opportunity to hire a lawyer of his own choice. Second, to any im­
partial observer, the trial judge's appointment of counsel for the 
Scottsboro Boys had been obviously inadequate. At a preliminary 
hearing, the judge had casually appointed the entirety of the 
Scottsboro bar, seven lawyers, to look after the defendants' interests 
prior to trial.66 This diffusion of responsibility not only ensured that 
nobody genuinely represented them, but also violated state law, which 
limited the number of court-appointed lawyers to two.67 On the day of 
trial, the judge appointed as their defense counsel a Tennessee lawyer, 
Stephen Roddy, who had been sent to Scottsboro by some of the de-
63. See Bowman, supra note 62, at 229. 
64. Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 48-59, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK 
BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 344-55. 
65. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text. 
66. For appointment of defense counsel and their performance during trial, see 
CARTER, supra note 11, at 17-50. 
67. For the diffusion of responsibility argument, see Powell, 287 U.S. at 56-57. For the 
state law violation, see Powell Petitioners' Brief, supra note 13, at 10, reprinted in 27 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 306. 
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fendants' families to look after their interests. When Roddy objected 
that he was unfamiliar with Alabama criminal procedure and thus was 
disinclined to take the assignment, the judge appointed a local mem­
ber of the bar to assist him with the defense. At the trial, while defense 
counsel did cross-examine prosecution witnesses, they made only a 
feeble effort to change the trial venue, presented neither opening nor 
closing arguments, and called none of their own witnesses other than 
the defendants, who implicated each other in a desperate attempt to 
avoid the death penalty.68 While the Scottsboro trials were not quite 
the sham affair under review in Moore, most impartial jurists certainly 
would have deemed inadequate the legal representation afforded to 
the Scottsboro Boys. Indeed, southern state supreme courts frequently 
had reversed convictions on state law grounds when counsel had been 
granted only a few days to prepare a defense.69 
Not only were the Scottsboro defendants plainly denied the right 
to counsel, but the trial record revealed a substantial probability that 
they were factually innocent - a circumstance likely to be of some 
significance to Supreme Court Justices reviewing their convictions, 
even if technically irrelevant to the merits of their appeal. Constitu­
tional criminal procedure safeguards often shield the guilty from pun­
ishment and for that reason frequently arouse public opposition. It 
seems only natural that the Justices would be more inclined to create 
novel criminal procedure rights in cases where defendants were plau­
sibly innocent. The medical evidence introduced at trial in the 
Scottsboro cases raised a serious doubt as to whether the two women 
had been raped at all. The accounts they provided on the witness stand 
also contradicted one another's. Moreover, they possessed a clear mo­
tive for fabrication - the wish to avoid a possible Mann Act prosecu­
tion for traveling across state lines for immoral purposes (prostitu­
tion). By the time Powell reached the Supreme Court in 1932, a 
substantial segment of national opinion had concluded that the 
Scottsboro Boys were innocent. Many newspapers, both in the North 
and the upper South, approved of the Court's reversal of the 
Scottsboro defendants' convictions, expressly noting the substantial 
doubts existing as to their guilt.70 
68. The inadequacies of defense counsel are enumerated in Powell Petitioners' Brief, 
supra note 13, at 9-14, 51-59, reprinted in 27 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 305-10, 
347-55. 
69. See, e.g., Stroud v. Commonwealth, 169 S.W. 1021 (Ky. 1914); see also McDaniel v. 
Commonwealth, 205 S.W. 915 (Ky. 1918); State v. Collins, 29 So. 180 (La. 1900) (discussing 
numerous additional Louisiana cases). 
70. See, e.g., Editorial, The Scottsboro Case, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB. ,  Nov. 8, 1932, at 20; 
Editorial, The Scottsboro Cases, BALT. SUN, Nov. 9, 1932, at 10; Editorial, Righteously Re­
manded, RICHMOND NEWS LEADER, Nov. 8, 1932, at 8; Editorial, The Scottsboro Case, 
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 9, 1932, at 10. 
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The Scottsboro Boys were retried by Alabama, beginning in 1933. 
Clarence Norris appealed his second conviction to the Supreme Court 
on the ground that blacks had been intentionally excluded from the 
juries that indicted and convicted him. Supreme Court precedents 
from the Plessy era made it exceedingly difficult for black defendants 
to prove race discrimination in jury selection.71 The Alabama Supreme 
Court rejected Norris's jury discrimination claim on the basis of these 
precedents.72 The state court refused to presume discrimination on the 
part of jury commissioners, denied the existence of an affirmative duty 
to place blacks on juries, and deferred to the commissioners' denials of 
racial motivation. In the Supreme Court, Alabama invoked Thomas v. 
Texas73 for the proposition that federal courts must defer to state court 
findings of fact on the issue of race discrimination in jury selection. 
The Supreme Court overturned Norris's conviction, implicitly re­
pudiating some of its Plessy-era precedents and reversing its first state 
criminal conviction on jury discrimination grounds since 1904.74 Norris 
did not create any new substantive constitutional law; since Strauder in 
1879, the Court consistently had construed the Equal Protection 
Clause to bar race discrimination in jury selection. However, Norris 
did require the Court to alter the critical subconstitutional rules, which 
for decades had doomed to failure virtually all jury discrimination 
claims. The Justices now reinvigorated the long dormant dicta of Neal 
v. Delaware,75 which had approved inferring intentional discrimination 
from the lengthy absence of blacks from jury service.76 The Norris 
Court declared that when no blacks had served on juries for a lengthy 
period of time in a county where many blacks satisfied the statutory 
qualifications for service, the state was obliged to provide some expla­
nation beyond a simple denial of race discrimination. Otherwise, the 
constitutional safeguard "would be but a vain and illusory require­
ment. "77 Further, Norris held that where the alleged constitutional 
violation turned on disputed facts, the federal courts must find those 
facts for themselves, rather than simply deferring to state findings -
71. See supra note 58. 
72. Norris v. State, 156 So. 556 (Ala. 1934). 
73. 212 U.S. 278 (1909). For Alabama's invocation of Thomas, see Brief in Opposition 
to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Norris v. Alabama, at 7. 
74. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904). On the inconsistency between Norris and 
Thomas, see Willard L. Eckhardt, Comment, 24 ILL. B.J. 233 (1936). 
75. 103 U.S. 370, 397 (1880). Most state courts had long ignored the Neal dicta. See 
Bernard S. Jefferson, Race Discrimination in Jury Service, 19 B.U. L. REV. 413, 424-25 
(1939). 
76. Norris, 294 U.S. at 591 (invoking Neal). 
77. Id. at 598. 
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"[t]hat the question is one of fact does not relieve us of the duty to de­
termine whether in truth a federal right has been denied. "78 
Norris was an attractive case for the Court to reconsider its Plessy­
era precedents on jury discrimination. Not only had blacks been ab­
sent from juries for decades in these Alabama counties with substan­
tial black populations - this was true in the Plessy-era precedents as 
well - but also local public officials had been trapped in an embar­
rassing lie. Seeking to deflect charges of race discrimination in jury 
selection, local court officers had forged black names on the jury rolls 
prior to Norris's retrial. Uncontradicted testimony at trial by the de­
fense handwriting expert had exposed this fraud.79 The only plausible 
explanation for it was the desire of these officers to cover up the inten­
tional exclusion of blacks from jury lists. In an unprecedented moment 
of high drama, Supreme Court Justices at oral argument examined the 
Jackson County jury rolls through magnifying glasses.80 
Norris was an appealing case in which to reconsider the subconsti­
tutional rules that had largely nullified the Strauder right for another 
reason as well. By 1935, the belief had spread that the Scottsboro Boys 
were innocent.81 At the first of the defendants' retrials in 1933, one of 
the young women who had charged rape, Ruby Bates, recanted her 
testimony, admitting that the two women had concocted the rape alle­
gation.82 Yet the Morgan County trial jury doggedly ignored her recan­
tation, apparently accepting the prosecution's contention that she had 
been bribed to perjure herself, and imposed a new death sentence on 
Haywood Patterson. Leading southern white journalists such as 
Douglas Southall Freeman of the Richmond New Leader and 
Josephus Daniels of the Raleigh News and Observer expressed outrage 
over the second round of convictions in light of the Scottsboro Boys' 
probable innocence.83 The Chattanooga News declared that "we can­
not conceive of a civilized community taking human lives on the 
strength of the miserable affair."84 The leading modern authority de­
scribes a "general national indignation over the Scottsboro Case,"85 
while a contemporary legal commentator noted the "widespread sym-
78. Id. at 589-90. Norris is usefully discussed in Schmidt, supra note 58, at 1476-83. 
79. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 282-83. 
80. See Norris, 294 U.S. at 593 n.l; CARTER, supra note 11, at 319-20; Hits Alabama Jury 
Book: Scottsboro Defense Charges Forgery of Names List, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1935, at 2. 
81. See GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 148-49. 
82. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 232; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 132. 
83. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 252-53, 270. 
84. CHATTANOOGA NEWS, quoted in The South Split Over the Scottsboro Verdict, 
LITERARY DIG., Apr. 22, 1933, at 4 (reporting other southern newspaper reaction as well). 
85. CARTER, supra note 11, at 322. 
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pathy and indignation aroused by the[ir] plight."86 This national sense 
of outrage was manifested in mass petitions and northern protest ral­
lies in which thousands of demonstrators assailed the second round of 
convictions.87 In New York City, such protests attracted the support of 
the mayor and leading Democratic Party politicians. Small wonder 
that newspapers throughout much of the country applauded the Su­
preme Court's reversal of Clarence Norris's conviction on jury dis­
crimination grounds.88 Outside of Alabama, most observers apparently 
had become convinced of the Scottsboro defendants' innocence. 
Brown v. Mississippi, the fourth of the Supreme Court's race­
related criminal procedure cases of the interwar period, also required 
the Justices to manufacture new constitutional law. Prior to Brown, 
the Supreme Court had not confronted a state criminal conviction 
grounded on a confession extracted through torture. In 1908, however, 
Twining v. New Jersey89 had denied that the Fifth Amendment privi­
lege against self-incrimination was incorporated against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Mississippi Supreme Court 
relied on Twining in rejecting the federal constitutional claim in 
Brown.<)() Moreover, even had the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
existence of such a federal constitutional right, precedent in analogous 
contexts would have suggested that deference be extended to state 
court findings of fact regarding the voluntariness of confessions. In 
Brown, the trial court found that the defendants' confessions to the 
sheriff (which took place after the tortured confessions extracted by 
the deputy sheriff) were voluntary. 
Still, if the Court was going to create novel constitutional law, 
Brown was about as appealing a case as one could find in which to do 
so. First, the new federal constitutional right identified by the Court -
a due process right not to be convicted on the basis of a confession ex­
tracted through torture - already was recognized by the law of every 
state. All state constitutions but two contained explicit rights against 
self-incrimination, and those two had adopted such a right through ju-
86. Recent Decision, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 776, 777 (1935). 
87. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 243-45; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 149, 152-53. 
88. See Recent Decision, supra note 86, at 777 & n.2 (reproducing opinions from other 
newspapers); see, e.g., Editorial, Justice for Negroes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1935, at 20; Edito­
rial, New Scottsboro Opinion, BALT. SUN, Apr. 3, 1935, at 12; Editorial, The Scottsboro De­
cision, N.Y. HERALD-TRIB., Apr. 2, 1935, at 18; Editorial, The Scottsboro Decision, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 3, 1935, at 8. 
89. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). 
90. Brown v. State, 161 So. 465, 468 (Miss. 1935). For the reliance on Twining, see Brief 
for Respondent at 6-7, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (No. 301), reprinted in 31 
LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 13, at 93, 104-05. 
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dicial construction.91 Moreover, every state court to consider the issue 
had agreed that confessions extracted through force or threats thereof 
must be excluded from evidence. The Mississippi Supreme Court had 
so held on numerous occasions during the 1920s.92 The state court re­
fused to reverse Brown's conviction because his state self­
incrimination claim had not been properly raised at trial and because 
the federal constitution had been construed not to protect against self­
incrimination in state courts.93 
Not only did Brown simply hold states to their own constitutional 
standards, but it also involved an especially appealing set of facts in 
which to create a new federal constitutional right. Incredibly, the dep­
uty sheriff admitted at trial the torture by which the defendants' con­
fessions had been obtained. He defended his actions on the candid 
though repulsive ground that the beatings were "[n]ot too much for a 
Negro."94 The sheriff, who received the defendants' subsequent "vol­
untary" confessions, admitted that one of the men still bore the marks 
of the whippings to which he had been subjected. Not only was the 
physical torture admitted by the State's witnesses, but the defendants' 
convictions rested almost entirely on these confessions. Without them, 
the prosecution's case would have been insufficient to go to the jury.95 
In short, Brown created a new constitutional right in a case involving 
possibly innocent defendants and undisputed facts regarding denial of 
the right. 
Finally, it seems doubtful that in 1936 any significant segment of 
public opinion would have opposed the Brown decision. The 
Wickersham Commission Report on Law Enforcement in 1931 had 
found increasing agreement among police chiefs that third degree 
practices were uncivilized and unacceptable. While the commission 
found that various forms of psychological coercion, such as holding 
prisoners incommunicado, were still quite common, physical torture 
seemed clearly on the decline.96 By 1936, moreover, public revulsion 
against Nazi and Stalinist law enforcement abuses would have inclined 
most Americans to distance themselves from the physical torture per-
91. For the state constitutions and judicial interpretations thereof, see Report on Law­
lessness in Law Enforcement, 11 U.S. Comm'n on Law Observance: and Enforcement 3-4, 
25, 28 (1931) [hereinafter Report on Lawlessness]. 
92. See infra note 128. 
93. Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 341-42 (Miss. 1935), 161 So. at 466-68. 
94. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 284 (1936); 161 So. at 471 (Griffith, J., dissent­
ing). 
95. Brown, 297 U.S. at 279; 161 So. at 471 .  
96. Report on Lawlessness, supra note 91, a t  43-46, 91. On that report's influence, see 
CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 120-21. 
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petrated upon the Brown defendants.97 Southern liberals were deeply 
disturbed by such practices, as evidenced by the participation in 
Brown's appeal of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation and the 
Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching 
(ASWPL).98 Both of the newspapers in Jackson, Mississippi, approved 
of the Brown decision.99 A scathing dissent in the state supreme court 
by Justice Griffiths noted that the transcript "reads more like pages 
tom from some mediaeval account than a record made within the con­
fines of a modem civilization which aspires to an enlightened constitu­
tional govemment."100 Brown was an easy case for Supreme Court Jus­
tices, who had little trouble distinguishing between a prosecutor 
commenting on the defendant's refusal to take the stand in his own 
defense (Twining) and " [t]he rack and torture chamber" (Brown).101 
Even Justice McReynolds, who had little sympathy either for blacks 
specifically or criminal defendants generally and had dissented in both 
Moore and Powell, was unprepared to defend Mississippi's practices in 
Brown.102 Indeed, it is hard to believe that the Court would not have 
reached the same result earlier had an appropriate case presented it­
self. But many defendants like Brown would have been lynched in an 
earlier period, and those who were not, generally lacked the funds 
necessary for an appeal to the Supreme Court. Brown got there only 
because of the financial support provided by the NAACP, the CIC, 
and the ASWPL.103 
Thus far, I have suggested that the race-related criminal procedure 
cases of the interwar period were attractive candidates for Supreme 
Court intervention because southern state courts operated under a dif­
ferent paradigm of legal justice from that of the High Court. The state 
courts viewed any trial, no matter how defective its procedures, as an 
improvement over a lynching. Supreme Court Justices, however, be­
lieved that criminal trials should seek to determine factual guilt or in­
nocence, not simply avoid a lynching. Yet it is also important to rec­
ognize that southern state supreme courts, especially after World War 
97. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 121; Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, 
Federalism and State Systems of Criminal Justice, 8 DE PAUL L. REV. 213, 219 (1959); 
Klarman, Civil Rights, supra note 18, at 65-66. 
98. See infra note 103. 
99. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 145-46. 
100. Brown, 161 So. at 470. 
101. Brown, 297 U.S. at 285-86. 
102. On McReynolds's notorious racism, see, e.g., A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., 
SHADES OF FREEDOM: RACIAL POLITTCS AND PRESUMPTIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
PROCESS 158-59 (1996); Robert L. Carter, Tribute (to Charles Hamilton Houston), 111 
HARV. L. REV. 2149, 2153-54 (1998). 
103. On the CIC and ASWPL's involvement, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 
90-102. On the difficulty of getting such cases to the Supreme Court, see infra notes 174-196 
and accompanying text. 
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I, generally were becoming more committed to securing procedural 
fairness for black defendants in criminal cases. Indeed, it is plausible 
to believe that the state supreme courts themselves might have re­
versed the criminal convictions in each of the four cases that reached 
the Supreme Court during the interwar period had the time and cir­
cumstances been slightly different. Yet in high profile cases that were 
perceived to pose more general challenges to the Jim Crow system and 
that incited outside criticism of the southern way of life, southern state 
courts regressed in their treatment of the procedural rights of black 
defendants. 
Southern state courts in criminal cases involving black defendants 
frequently bragged about the colorblind nature of southern justice. 
For example, in 1906 the Mississippi Supreme Court, reversing the 
murder conviction of a nonwhite defendant on the basis of the prose­
cutor's improper racial appeal to the jury, boasted that everyone -
black, white, and mulatto - is "on precisely the same exactly equal 
footing."104 The same court in a similar case fifteen years later ob­
served that "the humblest human being, be he white or black, red or 
yellow, is entitled to a fair and impartial trial on the sole issue of guilt 
or innocence under the law and evidence of the case."105 In one sense, 
these proud pretensions to colorblind justice were absurd. Everyone 
knew that blacks could not serve on southern juries, that black lawyers 
could not command a fair hearing in southern courts, that black wit­
nesses were treated as less credible than whites, that the death penalty 
never was imposed for the rape of black women, and so forth. Still, 
southern white judges may well have convinced themselves of the ve­
racity of their own colorblind rhetoric. As one prominent liberal 
southerner explained in 1933, "it is entirely possible for a southern 
white man to be uncompromisingly in favor of justice to the Negro 
and uncompromisingly against intermarriage. "106 Indeed, by the 1920s, 
southern state supreme courts regularly reversed convictions of black 
defendants charged with serious crimes against whites, occasionally 
even murder or rape, on a wide variety of procedural grounds -
prejudicial racial appeals by prosecutors to juries, improper denial by 
the trial judge of a motion for change of venue, inadequate opportu­
nity for defense counsel to prepare a case, and coerced confessions.107 
104. Hampton v. State, 40 So. 545, 546 (Miss. 1906). 
105. Funches v. State, 87 So. 487, 488 (Miss. 1921). For similar examples of colorblind 
rhetoric, see Jones v. State, 109 So. 189, 190-91 (Ala. Ct. App. 1926); Clark v. State, 59 So. 
887, 888 (Miss. 1912); Morehead v. State, 151 P. 1183, 1190 (Okla. Crim. App. 1915). 
106. JOHN T. KNEEBONE, SOUTHERN LIBERAL JOURNALISTS AND THE ISSUE OF RACE, 
1920-1944, at 91 (1985) (quoting Virginius Dabney). 
107. Many such cases are cited and discussed in MANGUM, supra note 29, chs.14, 16; 
MCMILLEN, supra note 20, ch.6. For a few of these cases, see Williams v. State, 146 So. 422 
(Ala. 1933); Byrd v. State, 123 So. 867 (Miss. 1929); Story v. State, 97 So. 806 (Miss. 1923); 
Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 (Ga. 1914); State v. Jones, 53 So. 959 (La. 1911); Tannehill v. 
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However, this apparent willingness of southern appellate courts to 
extend procedural justice to black criminal defendants seemed to dis­
sipate in cases that were perceived to implicate broader challenges to 
white supremacy or that generated national criticism of the white 
South's treatment of black criminal defendants. It is, perhaps, a natu­
ral human tendency to react defensively toward criticism by outsiders. 
White southerners may have been especially sensitive to such criticism 
owing to their historical memories of the Civil War and Reconstruc­
tion.108 
The Scottsboro cases are the clearest illustration of this phenome­
non, though Moore and Brown plausibly are exemplars as well. The 
Alabama Supreme Court previously had reversed convictions in cases 
similar to Scottsboro on the ground that a change of venue should 
have been granted owing to mob domination.109 Other southern state 
supreme courts, in less publicized cases, had reversed convictions on 
the ground that defense counsel had been given inadequate opportu­
nity to prepare, even when appointment of counsel had taken place a 
couple of days before trial, rather than the morning thereof.U0 Yet in 
Powell, the Alabama Supreme Court implausibly ruled that a fair trial 
was possible notwithstanding the presence of a mob surrounding the 
courthouse and that the right to counsel had been satisfied notwith­
standing the farcical appointment of counsel the morning of the 
trial.111 
The Alabama court's refusal to reverse convictions stemming from 
obviously unfair trials was plausibly attributable, at least in part, to the 
judges' defensive reaction to national criticism leveled against 
Alabama for its treatment of the Scottsboro defendants.112 The Com-
State, 48 So. 662 (Ala. 1909); Sykes v. State, 42 So. 875 (Miss. 1907) (mem.); cases cited su­
pra note 69; see also cases cited infra note 128. For the suggestion that southern state appel­
late courts were less likely to discriminate against blacks because the judges were more pro­
fessionalized and were relatively independent of local opinion, see 1 MYRDAL, supra note 
25, at 552, 555. 
108. On southern sensitivity to outside interference, see generally CARTER, supra note 
11, at 109-10; Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change and the Civil Rights Movement, 80 
VA. L. REV. 7, 109-11 (1994); Owsley, supra note 39. 
Obviously there were exceptions, such as the dissenting state appellate judges in Powell 
and Brown, and the trial judge in one of the Scottsboro cases who heroically ordered a new 
trial after the jury had returned a guilty verdict, thereby costing himself his job in the fol­
lowing year's election. See Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214 (Ala. 1932) (Anderson, C.J., dis­
senting); Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 343 (Miss. 1935) (Anderson, J., dissenting); 161 So. 
465, 471 (Miss. 1935) (Griffith, J., dissenting); CARTER, supra note 11, at 223-34, 266, 273. 
My point is one about tendencies, not universal laws. 
109. See, e.g., Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922); Thompson v. State, 23 So. 676 
(Ala. 1898) (mem.). 
110. See cases cited supra note 69. 
111 .  Powell v. State, 141 So. 201 (Ala.), rev'd 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
112. On the circling-the-wagons effect of Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 109-
10, 180-81; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 47-50; Owsley, supra note 39; Fletcher, supra note 
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munist International Labor Defense ("ILD"), which provided the 
Scottsboro Boys with defense counsel on their initial appeals and re­
trials, immediately converted Scottsboro into a national and interna­
tional cause celebre, conducting mass protest meetings in northern 
cities as well as orchestrating demonstrations at United States consu­
lates overseas in the spring and summer of 1931.113 The ILD consis­
tently portrayed white Alabamians as "lynchers" for their treatment of 
the Scottsboro defendants. Sensitive to Yankee criticism in any con­
text, Alabama whites were particularly enraged at Communists pillo­
rying their state, especially at a time when the Communist Party was 
achieving some success at organizing rural Alabama farm workers in 
the midst of depression.114 Thousands of abusive and threatening pro­
test letters from around the world were directed toward Alabama's 
governor and state supreme court justices.115 Those jurists were said to 
be "seething with anger at an avalanche of protests, demands, and 
threats."116 When Chief Justice Anderson opened the state court's ses­
sion early in 1932, he expressly criticized these inflammatory mes­
sages, which had been made with "the evident intent to bulldoze th[ e] 
court."117 After the state court rejected the appeal in Powell, 
Anderson, the sole dissenter, explained in a letter t:o Walter White of 
the NAACP that his brethren had been swayed into denying a new 
trial by the ILD tactics, to which they did not wish to appear to be ca­
pitulating.118 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Powell, reversing the 
first round of Scottsboro convictions, only exacerbated the already de­
fensive tendencies of white Alabamians. After the initial trials, some 
division of opinion continued to exist in Alabama as to whether the 
defendants had received a fair hearing.119 After the Supreme Court's 
"stinging rebuke" of the state supreme court, however, public doubts 
regarding the defendants' guilt or the fairness of their trials could no 
22; John Temple Graves, Alabama Resents Outside Agitation, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1931, § 3, 
at 5. For a similar effect in Frank, see DINNERSTEIN, supra note 42, at 105-06, 116-17. 
113. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 141-44, 243-45, 250-51; GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 
28-29. 
114. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 119-36, 152-53, 174-78; GOODMAN, supra note 11,  at 
27-31. 
115. CARTER, supra note 11, at 145; GOODMAN, supra note 11,  at 47-48; Scottsboro 
Ruling Evokes Praise Here, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1932, at 11. 
116. CARTER, supra note 11, at 156. 
117. Quoted in id. ; see GOODMAN, supra note 11, at 49-50. 
118. CARTER, supra note 11, at 159-60. 
119. See id. at 113, 136; Editorial, The Affirmation of the Scottsboro Cases, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 25, 1932, at 52. 
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longer be expressed publicly without repercussions.120 The Commis­
sion on Interracial Cooperation, which often participated in the ap­
peals of southern blacks convicted in obviously unfair trials, refused to 
become involved in the defense of the Scottsboro Boys because of 
hostile public opinion.121 Lonely voices of liberal dissent raised in de­
fense of the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama were forcefully squelched. A 
protesting Jewish rabbi was pressured by his congregation to resign 
and then was run out of the state, and a critical Birmingham college 
professor had his contract terminated.122 The ILD-provided defense 
attorney, Samuel Leibowitz, only made matters worse by lambasting 
white Alabamians as "lantern jawed morons and lynchers"123 in widely 
publicized speeches in New York City. The issue at the second and 
third round of trials was more one of loyalty to Alabama and its sys­
tem of white supremacy than the defendants' guilt or innocence. The 
prosecutor at one of the defendants' retrials devoted more of his clos­
ing argument to attacking New York City than to discussing the de­
fendant's guilt.124 The jury foreman in Haywood Patterson's third trial, 
convinced of the defendant's innocence, explained that the jurors felt 
they simply could not vote for acquittal and return to live in their 
communities, and thus compromised instead on a seventy-five-year 
prison sentence.125 ILD criticism of Alabama made it all but impossi­
ble politically for the governor to commute the Scottsboro Boys' sen­
tences.126 
The Arkansas Supreme Court's refusal to reverse the convictions 
in Moore v. Dempsey may be similarly explained. Here, the court's 
predicament was less the state's defensive reaction to outside criticism 
than the difficulty of taking the side of blacks in a legal dispute that 
had originated in a fundamental challenge to white supremacy - the 
effort of black workers to organize a tenant farmers' union - and had 
culminated in a race war. The real issue posed by the state litigation in 
Moore was not whether the defendants were guilty of murder but 
rather whether to vindicate the official story of the white community 
that the race riot had been instigated by a black conspiracy to murder 
white planters. Posed in such stark terms, the choice cannot have been 
120. On the galvanizing effect of Powell, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 190 (quoting the 
BIRMINGHAM POST). 
121. See id. at 118-19, 153; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 37-39. On the CIC's in­
volvement in similar cases, see id. at 90-102; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 238 & n.119. 
122. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 253-61. 
123. Quoted in Owsley, supra note 39, at 284; see also CARTER, supra note 11, at 244-46 
(describing white Alabamian outrage at Leibowitz's remarks in New York City); 
GOODMAN, supra note 11,  at 152 (same). 
124. CARTER, supra note 11, at 372. 
125. Id. at 348. 
126. See id. at 100, 119-20, 389-97. 
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difficult for an all-white jury chosen from the local community. While 
Arkansas Supreme Court justices enjoyed both greater distance and 
independence from local public opinion, it is scarcely surprising that 
they would have chosen to side with Phillips County whites in their 
struggle to maintain white supremacy. In less celebrated cases that 
posed little threat to the Jim Crow system, state supreme courts 
throughout the South previously had reversed convictions on the basis 
of mob-dominated trial proceedings.127 
The Mississippi Supreme Court's refusal to reverse the convictions 
in Brown is difficult to comprehend except on the basis of this back­
lash interpretation. On several occasions in the 1910s and 1920s, that 
court reversed criminal convictions of black defendants on the basis of 
coerced confessions that had been extracted with less brutality than 
was involved in Brown, where one of the defendants had been twice 
strung up from a tree in an effort to induce his confession.128 More­
over, in at least one of these earlier cases, the state court ruled that 
whether or not the defendant had objected to the introduction of his 
coerced confession at the appropriate point of the trial, the appellate 
court must overturn his conviction, since " [t]he duty of maintaining 
constitutional rights of a person on trial for his life rises above mere 
rules of procedure."129 Yet in Brown, the same court refused to con­
sider the defendants' coerced confession claim under the state consti­
tution because their lawyer had objected to it at the wrong point in the 
trial proceedings.130 
127. See, e.g., Newman v. State, 84 S.E. 579 (Ga. 1915); Graham v. State, 82 S.E. 282 
(Ga. 1914); State v. Weldon, 74 S.E. 43 (S.C. 1912), overruled in part by State v. Thompson, 
115 S.E. 326 (S.C. 1922); Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328 (Ky. 1909); Brown v. 
State, 36 So. 73 (Miss. 1904); Collier v. State, 42 S.E. 226 (Ga. 1902); Thompson v. State, 23 
So. 676 (Ala. 1898); Massey v. State, 20 S.W. 758 (Tex Crim. App. 1892); MANGUM, supra 
note 29, at 278, 282-85. That the Arkansas Supreme Court twice reversed the death sen­
tences of another set of six Phillips County defendants may appear to undermine this inter­
pretation. However, the state judges may have regarded these as compromise verdicts. So 
long as some of the Phillips County defendants were executed, the State's interest in vindi­
cating white supremacy was satisfied. On the other state supreme court decisions arising 
from the Phillips County riot, see Ware v. State, 252 S.W. 934 (Ark. 1923) (Ware II); 225 
S.W. 626 (Ark. 1920) (Ware !); CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.5; Walter F. White, The 
Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); Victory in Arkansas, 26 THE CRISIS 
163 (1923); J.S. Waterman & E.E. Overton, The Aftermath of Moore v. Dempsey, 6 ARK. L .  
REV. & B. Ass'N J. 1 (1951-52). 
128. See, e.g., Fisher v. State, 110 So. 361 (Miss. 1926); Whip v. State, 109 So. 697 (Miss. 
1926); White v. State, 91 So. 903 (Miss. 1922); Matthews v. State, 59 So. 842 (Miss. 1912); 
MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 213. For similar decisions from other southern states, see, for 
example, Bell v. State, 9 S.W.2d 238 (Ark. 1928); Enoch v. Commonwealth, 126 S.E. 222 (Va. 
1925). 
129. Fisher, 110 So. at 365. For similar willingness by the Mississippi Supreme Court to 
overlook a procedural default by a black defendant, see Butler v. State, 112 So. 685 (Miss. 
1927). 
130. See Brown v. State, 158 So. 339, 342-43 (Miss. 1935), 161 So. 465, 466-67 (Miss. 
1935). 
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Brown did not generate national publicity. The NAACP intention­
ally maintained a low profile so as not to prejudice the defendants' 
chances for a reversal of their convictions in the state supreme court 
or for a commutation of their sentences by the governor.131 Mississippi 
was not vilified in the national press over Brown as Alabama had been 
over Scottsboro. Thus, the turnabout by the Mississippi Supreme 
Court on the issue of coerced confessions seems attributable not to a 
backlash against outside criticism in connection with Brown but rather 
to a general shift in regional judicial outlook flowing from Scottsboro. 
After watching a neighboring state being pilloried before the nation 
for its treatment of black criminal defendants, a majority of Mississippi 
Supreme Court justices apparently were convinced of the desirability, 
when possible, of insulating that court's judgments from federal scru­
tiny by invoking state procedural defaults. This shift in approach al­
ready was apparent in two decisions handed down by that court be­
tween Scottsboro in 1931 and Brown in 1935. In Perkins v. State132 the 
Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed a murder conviction partly on the 
ground that defense counsel had failed to move for the exclusion of an 
allegedly coerced confession at the appropriate point in the trial. In 
Carraway v. State133 that court refused to reverse a death sentence for 
rape even though defense counsel had declined to seek a continuance 
or a change of venue for fear that his client would be lynched. One 
cannot know for sure, but southern state judges may have concluded 
after Scottsboro that if northerners were intent on criticizing southern 
states for their treatment of black criminal defendants notwithstanding 
the recent progress they felt had been made toward achieving color­
blind justice, they were not going to offer any assistance in that enter­
prise.134 
In sum, the Supreme Court's race-related criminal procedure deci­
sions of the interwar period almost certainly were consonant with 
dominant national opinion. Most of the country was appalled by these 
farcical proceedings in which southern black defendants, quite plausi­
bly innocent of the offenses charged, were tortured into confessing 
and then rushed to the death penalty in mob-dominated trials without 
effective assistance of counsel. Black criminal defendants certainly 
were not treated this way in the North. While northern blacks were 
segregated in ghetto neighborhoods and discriminated against in em­
ployment and public accommodations, the administration of justice in 
northern courts was relatively nondiscriminatory.135 
131. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 95-96, 103. 
132. 135 So. 357 (Miss. 1931). 
133. 154 So. 306 (Miss. 1934) . .  
134. For a similar example, see Patterson v. State, 156 So. 567 (Ala. 1934). 
135. On northern discrimination against blacks, see, for example, KENNETH L. 
KUSMER, A GHETIO TAKES SHAPE: BLACK CLEVELAND, 1870-1930, at ch.8 (1976); 1 
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The difference between northern and southern treatment of blacks 
charged with serious crimes against whites is typified by the most cele­
brated NAACP case of the 1920s, the criminal defense of black doctor 
Ossian Sweet and his family.136 Several members of the Sweet family 
were charged in a Detroit courtroom with murder for allegedly killing 
a member of a white mob that assaulted their home in an effort to 
drive them out of a white neighborhood. The trial before Judge (later 
Supreme Court Justice) Frank Murphy was strikingly fair, according 
to contemporary testimonials by NAACP leaders, especially in light of 
the extent of Klan influence in Detroit in the mid-1920s. After a first 
trial involving several Sweet family members ended with a deadlocked 
jury, Dr. Sweet's brother was acquitted in the only retrial that took 
place. It is difficult to imagine a similar result in a southern courtroom 
during this time period. Yet, even in the South, many whites did not 
condone the sort of treatment of black criminal defendants that the 
Supreme Court denounced in these interwar decisions.137 As the 
Swedish social scientist Gunnar Myrdal observed in his classic study of 
American race relations, An American Dilemma, discrimination in the 
legal system was near the bottom of the white supremacist hierarchy 
of values.138 That is, many white southerners who were intensely com­
mitted to racial segregation in education and to legal bans on interra­
cial marriage did not endorse manifestly unfair trials for black criminal 
defendants. For this reason, it was possible to enlist eminent white 
counsel to represent black criminal defendants like Moore or Brown 
on appeal.139 During this time period, securing such representation for 
black litigants challenging public school segregation or disfranchise­
ment would have been virtually impossible. 
Perhaps the Justices would have been unwilling to intervene in 
these cases had the facts been significantly less egregious than they 
were. The paradox of these criminal procedure cases is that while the 
facts made them easy, the law made them hard. Prior to Moore, 
MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 293-96, 304-06; ALLAN H. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE 
MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETTO 1890-1920, at ch.11 (1967); Hannibal Gerald Duncan, "The 
Changing Race Relationship in the Border and Northern States" chs.3-4 (Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Pennsylvania, 1922). On regional differences in legal treatment of blacks, see 1 
MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 526-29, 534. 
136. On Sweet, see NAACP Papers (microfilm edition), pt. 5, reel 3, passim, especially 
frames 164, 230, 462-63. 
137. See, e.g., Henry J. McGuinn, Equal Protection of the Law and Fair Trials in Mary­
land, 24 J. NEGRO HIST. 143, 145 (1939). 
138. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 60-61; see also SAMUEL N. PINCUS, THE VIRGINIA 
SUPREME COURT, BLACKS AND THE LAW 1870-1902, at 247-48 (1990). 
139. See, e.g., CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 64-69; CORTNER, MOB, supra note 
10, at 43-44; AUGUST MEIER & ELLIOTT RUDWICK, ALONG THE COLOR LINE: 
EXPLORATIONS IN THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 134 (1976); 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 555-
56; Emanuel, supra note 13, at 234-36. 
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scarcely any precedent existed for federal court intervention in the 
state criminal process. Moore required a departure from Frank, and 
Norris implicitly repudiated Plessy-era precedents on race discrimina­
tion in jury selection. Powell and Brown involved no departure from 
precedent only because these decisions were truly unprecedented; the 
Court never before had broached the subject of reversing state crimi­
nal convictions on the ground that the right to counsel had been vio­
lated or confessions had been coerced. For the Court effectively to in­
tervene in these cases, it had to do something that the Justices 
understandably would have been reluctant to do: accuse state courts 
or state officials of lying.140 Moore required the Court to disbelieve a 
state appellate tribunal's determination that trial proceedings had not 
been corrupted by mob domination. Norris required the Justices to 
substitute their judgment for that of the state supreme court on the 
question of whether jury commissioners had lied when denying any 
racial motivation in jury selection. Finally, to render Brown effective, 
the Court would have to be willing to question denials by state law en­
forcement officials that they had beaten black defendants into con­
fessing. The Court's willingness to blaze such trails may have de­
pended on the confluence of two factors: appealing cases in which the 
injustice to black defendants and the dishonesty of the state appellate 
courts were manifest, and an incipient transformation of the extralegal 
context which rendered the Justices more sensitive to and less tolerant 
of the egregious mistreatment of blacks by the southern criminal jus­
tice system.141 
II. CONSEQUENCES 
A. Direct Effects 
The Court's remand of the criminal convictions in Moore for a 
hearing on the question of mob domination may have had the effect of 
saving the lives of the black defendants. Given public opinion in 
Arkansas regarding the Phillips County race riot, the governor might 
have been disinclined to run the political risk of commuting their sen­
tences had the Court not first intervened. On the other hand, since the 
governor did in fact commute their sentences after Moore, rather than 
forcing them to proceed with their habeas hearing in federal district 
court and possibly a new trial in state court, it is possible that their 
lives would have been spared regardless of the Court's decision. After 
140. On the willingness to second-guess state court findings of fact, see NELSON, supra 
note 59, at 103-05; Recent Case, 1 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116, 117 (1932). 
141. I have sketched that extralegal context in some detail in Michael J. Klarman, Nei­
ther Hero, Nor Villain: The Supreme Court, Race, and the Constitution in the Twentieth 
Century ch.3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript). 
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all, nothing prevented the state from retrying the defendants after 
Moore. The Scottsboro Boys, for example, were retried, reconvicted, 
and resentenced to death on more than one occasion after the Court 
first reversed their convictions in Powell v. Alabama. By 1923, public 
furor over the Phillips County race riot may have dissipated suffi­
ciently that the Moore defendants would not have been executed re­
gardless of the Court's disposition of their case. Nobody can know for 
certain.142 
Measuring the broader impact of Moore also is impossible. Obvi­
ously the decision did not end mob-dominated trials in the South or 
even induce state appellate courts consistently to reverse guilty ver­
dicts in such cases. Scottsboro and many other similar cases in the late 
1920s and 1930s make this clear.143 Indeed some lower courts, both 
state and federal, construed Moore narrowly and refused to find mob 
domination on somewhat less egregious facts.144 Moreover, even to the 
extent that fewer mob-dominated trials took place in the South after 
Moore, any reduction might have been attributable to changing social 
circumstances rather than to the Supreme Court. Urbanization, indus­
trialization, better education, improvements in communication and 
transportation, more professionalized law enforcement, and the 
greater threat of federal government intervention all combined to 
erode the environment that had been conducive to southern 
lynchings.145 Naturally, a reduction in lynchings eventually translated 
into fewer mob-dominated trials. The number of lynchings in the 
South declined steadily through the 1920s and 1930s, with the excep­
tion of a brief resurgence in the early years of the Depression.146 Obvi­
ously this phenomenon was not attributable to the Supreme Court, 
since lynchings were beyond the Court's power to control. Any reduc­
tion in the number of mob-dominated trials similarly may not have 
been ascribable to the Court. 
The Supreme Court probably saved the Scottsboro Boys from exe­
cution. Given public opinion in Alabama in the early 1930s, the gover­
nor almost certainly would not have commuted their death sentences. 
Yet the Court's reversal of the first round of convictions in Powell and 
the second in Norris did not prevent the State from initiating a third 
142. On Moore's aftermath, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, ch.8; Waterman & 
Overton, supra note 127, at 6-7; The Arkansas Cases Nearly Ended, 27 THE CRISIS 124 
(1924); The End of the Arkansas Cases, 29 THE CRISIS 272 (1925). 
143. For post-Moore mob-dominated trials, see, for example, State v. Wilson, 158 So. 
621 (La. 1935); Downer v. Dunaway, 1 F. Supp. 1001 (M.D. Ga. 1932); Powell v. State, 141 
So. 201 (Ala.), rev'd, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Ex parte Hollins, 14 P.2d 243 (Okla. Crim. App. 
1932). ' 
144. See, e.g., Bard v. Chilton, 20 F. 2d 906 (6th Cir. l927); Powell, 141 So. at 208-09. 
145. See supra note 27. 
146. See, e.g., 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 269; Miller, supra note 21, at 225. 
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series of prosecutions, which resulted in one more death sentence and 
several lengthy prison terms.147 Indeed, the Supreme Court reversals 
seemed only to further inflame local opinion, ensuring that prosecu­
tors would not drop the cases and that juries would continue to convict 
and to impose draconian sentences.148 Eventually the Supreme Court 
ran out of plausible federal constitutional grounds for reversing the 
defendants' convictions. In 1937, the Justices refused to review 
Haywood Patterson's fourth conviction, which carried a seventy-five­
year prison sentence.149 The fact that the Justices likely believed the 
Scottsboro Boys to be innocent did not, unfortunately, amount to a 
sound constitutional basis for reversing their convictions. So the 
Scottsboro Boys, who certainly were innocent of the crimes charged, 
wound up spending from five to twenty years in prison apiece, not­
withstanding the Court's two reversals of their convictions.1so As the 
Justices again would discover following their school desegregation 
ruling in 1954, a state judiciary determined to have its way and willing 
to dissemble in doing so possessed a wide variety of means for frus­
trating federal court intervention.1s1 
As to broader impact, we have no way of determining whether 
Powell led to better legal representation for black defendants in 
southern criminal cases. Even to the extent that legal assistance was 
improved over time, the cause might have been the increasing profes­
sionalization of the southern legal system as well as a growing convic­
tion among more progressive white southerners that Jim Crow could 
be preserved without sacrificing the lives of innocent black defen­
dants. Moreover, Justice Sutherland's Powell opinion was written as 
narrowly as was humanly possible. Not only did the ruling cover only 
capital cases, but it seemed to be limited to the precise facts of 
Scottsboro - "the ignorance and illiteracy of the defendants, their 
youth, the circumstances of public hostility, the imprisonment and the 
close surveillance of the defendants by the military forces . . . .  "1s2 
Even if Powell did ensure better legal representation for southern 
black defendants, how much this affected actual case outcomes is un-
147. CARTER, supra note 11 ,  chs. 10-11. 
148. Id. at 181, 189-90, 329. 
149. Id. at 379. 
150. See id. , chs. 1 1-12. 
151. On the Alabama judiciary's willingness to "cheat" to ensure convictions in retrials 
of the Scottsboro defendants, see id. at 341-46. On post-Brown evasions by state courts, see 
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THuRGOOD MARSHALL AND THE 
SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961, at 283-89 (1994); Del Dickson, State Court Defiance and the 
Limits of Supreme Court Authority: Williams v. Georgia Revisited, 103 YALE L.J. 1423 
(1994); Darryl Paulson & Paul Hawkes, Desegregating the University of Florida Law School: 
Virgil Hawkins v. The Florida Board of Control, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 59 (1984). 
152. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. 
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certain. The ILD criticized Powell because the Justices apparently had 
selected the least significant ground for reversing the Scottsboro Boys' 
convictions. Indeed, the Communists accused the Court of simply pro­
viding Alabama with instructions on how properly to lynch the defen­
dants.153 Even if appointed days before trial and afforded adequate 
opportunity to prepare a defense, counsel generally could do little to 
assist clients like the Scottsboro Boys. Black lawyers, who might have 
been willing aggressively to pursue their clients' defense, were few and 
far between in the South, and in any event were distinct liabilities ow­
ing to the prejudice they aroused among white judges and juries. 
White lawyers, on the other hand, generally refrained from pressing 
defenses that raised broader challenges to the Jim Crow system, such 
as race-based exclusion from juries.154 In any event, even the most ear­
nest advocacy rarely could influence case outcomes when the system 
was so pervasively stacked against fair adjudication of the legal claims 
of black defendants. The Scottsboro Boys did enjoy outstanding legal 
representation in their retrials, yet it made absolutely no difference to 
the outcomes. 
Getting blacks onto southern juries was of greater practical impor­
tance than having defense lawyers appointed with sufficient time to 
prepare their cases. This is why contemporary observers deemed the 
jury exclusion claim of the Scottsboro Boys to be more significant than 
the right-to-counsel argument. Yet, in practice, Norris had very little 
impact on black jury service in the South. 
The southern press reaction to Norris generally was calm and col­
lected.155 Newspapers expressed confidence that the decision easily 
could be circumvented through lawful means. The Jackson 
(Mississippi) Daily News deemed the ruling a minor nuisance because 
lawyers would have to invest time in devising methods to evade it.156 In 
states like Mississippi and South Carolina, where jury service was 
linked to voter registration, Norris made essentially no difference at 
all because blacks still were almost universally disfranchised in the 
1930s.157 As to other southern states, Norris still did not call into ques-
153. See supra note 61. 
154. On the difficulty faced by southern black defendants in securing decent legal repre­
sentation, see infra notes 177-187 and accompanying text. 
155. See CARTER, supra note 11 ,  at 326-27. 
156. See CARTER, supra note 11, at 326 (discussing the reaction of the Daily News 
(Jackson, Miss.)). For other contemporary predictions that Norris would be evaded, see 
MANGUM, supra note 29, at 333; NELSON, supra note 59, at 82 (quoting view of NAACP's 
William Pickens); J.F. Barbour, Jr., Note, The Exclusion of Negroes from Jury Service, 8 
MISS. L.J. 196, 200-01 (1935); Recent Decision, supra note
. 
86. 
157. See State v. Grant, 19 S.E.2d 638 (S.C. 1942); NELSON, supra note 59, at 82-83; 
Barbour, supra note 156, at 201-04; Negroes and Jury Service in the Southern States, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 5, 1935, at 8; CHARLESTON NEWS & COURIER, Apr. 13, 1935, at 
4; BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Apr. 30, 1935, at 1, reproduced in THE AITITUDE OF THE 
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tion the constitutionality of the typical southern state jury selection 
scheme, which vested enormous discretion in the hands of (white) jury 
commissioners. Proving the existence of race discrimination in the 
administration of such a scheme remained a formidable task, Norris 
notwithstanding, especially since state courts continued to make the 
initial factual determinations. 
Most white southerners correctly concluded that Norris could be 
circumvented by placing a few black names on the jury rolls. Blacks on 
the list rarely were called for actual service, and those who were called 
frequently could be intimidated out of serving. Moreover, the pres­
ence of an occasional black man on a grand jury could be nullified 
through the use of supermajority, rather than unanimity, voting rules 
for indictment. For example, the Jackson County grand jury that rein­
dicted the Scottsboro Boys after Norris consisted of thirteen whites 
and one black and operated under a rule requiring only a two-thirds 
majority for indictment.158 The even more occasional black man called 
for service on petit juries after Norris could be excluded through 
challenges for cause, over which trial judges exercised enormous dis­
cretion, or through peremptory challenges, the number of which some 
states increased in order to nullify Norris's potential impact.159 Thus, 
for example, in Haywood Patterson's retrial, 12 blacks appeared on 
the trial jury venire of 100, but 7 were excused upon request and the 
other five were struck with peremptories. In Clarence Norris's retrial, 
another all-white jury reconvicted and resentenced him to death.160 
The most that Norris seems to have accomplished anywhere - and 
even then only in large cities in the peripheral South - was to place a 
single black person onto an occasional jury.161 These were the same 
parts of the South where changing public opinion with regard to race 
might have induced acceptance of occasional black jury service re­
gardless of Supreme Court intervention.162 Even before Norris, blacks 
had begun to serve again sporadically on juries in parts of Maryland, 
SOUTHERN WHITE PRESS TOWARD NEGRO SUFFRAGE, 1932-1940, at 2 (Rayford W. Logan 
ed., 1940). 
158. For the post-Norris proceedings, see CARTER, supra note 11,  at 338-41. 
159. On the use of jury challenges to circumvent Norris, see NELSON, supra note 59, at 
82-83 & n.100; Eckhardt, supra note 74, at 233-35. 
160. On the continued difficulty of proving race discrimination in jury selection, see 
Jefferson, supra note 75, at 433-34, 447, and Schmidt, supra note 58, at 1482. On Norris's 
third death sentence, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 369-70. 
161. NELSON, supra note 59, at 82 n.96. 
162. See, e.g., Walter White, George Crawford - Symbol, 41 THE CRISIS 15 (1934); 
John Temple Graves, Scottsboro Ruling Disturbs the South, N.Y. DMES, Apr. 7, 1935, § 3, at 
6. 
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Virginia, and Tennessee.163 In the deep South and in rural areas 
throughout the region, exclusion of blacks from juries remained the 
rule for another generation after Norris.164 A study conducted by 
southern social scientist Arthur Raper in 1940 found that the vast 
majority of rural counties in the deep South "have made no pretense 
of putting Negroes on jury lists, much less calling or using them in tri­
als."165 In a Louisiana case that reached the Supreme Court in 1939, a 
rural parish with a black population of nearly fifty percent had "com­
plied" with Norris by placing the names of three blacks, one of whom 
was dead, on a jury venire of 300.166 A study of the border state of Ken­
tucky found that all fifteen black men executed by the State from 1940 
to 1962 were convicted by all-white juries for crimes committed 
against whites.167 White judges and white prosecutors in Kentucky 
simply continued to exclude blacks from juries in racially sensitive 
cases. 
As with Scottsboro, the Supreme Court's intervention in Brown 
almost certainly saved three southern blacks from the death penalty. 
Yet, also as with Scottsboro, defendants who quite possibly were fac­
tually innocent spent substantial periods (three to seven years) in jail, 
notwithstanding the Court's intervention on their behalf. Skeptical of 
their chances of securing an acquittal on retrial, the defendants in 
Brown deemed it prudent to accept a plea bargain with prison sen­
tences rather than risk reimposition of the death penalty after a sec­
ond trial.168 
It is impossible to measure the amount of physical coercion em­
ployed by southern sheriffs to extract confessions from black suspects, 
and thus one cannot say for sure what effect Brown v. Mississippi had 
on this practice. Supreme Court cases from the 1940s, however, make 
it clear that beating blacks into confessing remained a common prac­
tice in the South after Brown.169 For a variety of reasons, Brown had, 
163. See, e.g., Harry H. Jones, The Negro Before the Court During 1932, 40 THE CRISIS 
230 (1933); White, supra note 162; Editorial, Negroes as Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1932, at 
16. 
164. See, e.g., FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 41, at 63-64; 1 SITKOFF, supra note 61, at 231 
(noting U.S. Civil Rights Commission report from 1960s); PITTSBURGH COURIER, Jan. 29, 
1943, at 3. 
165. Quoted in 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 549-50. 
166. Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 359 (1939). 
167. Wright, Legal Executions, supra note 20, at 266. 
168. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 153, 159. 
169. See, e.g., Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); White v. Texas, 310 U.S. 530 (1940); 
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940); Florida's Little Scottsboro: Groveland, 56 THE 
CRISIS 266, 267 (1949) (describing beating of blacks accused of rape in Groveland, Fla.); 
Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 55 THE CRISIS 123, 123 (1948) (detailing NAACP's efforts 
in late 1940s on behalf of rape suspect forced to "confess" through "force, violence, and 
fear"); Along the N.A.A.C.P. Battlefront, 50 THE CRISIS 371, 372-73 (1943) (discussing 1941 
conviction of Oklahoman black whose confession had been obtained through violence); see 
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at most, a limited impact on southern police practices. First, it must be 
recalled that the deputy sheriff who had administered the beatings in 
Brown made no effort to hide his behavior. The likeliest effect of the 
Supreme Court's decision, then, was to reduce the candor of state law 
enforcement officials. If sheriffs denied coercion of black criminal de­
fendants and state courts believed them, it was difficult for a reviewing 
federal court to find a constitutional violation. Second, Brown pro­
vided little direct incentive for southern sheriffs to discontinue their 
traditional methods of handling black suspects. Tortured confessions, 
if detected, might eventually be reversed by the Supreme Court or 
even by a state appellate court, but the vast majority of criminal cases 
never made it that far in the system.170 Thus, most convictions based 
on coerced confessions were unlikely ever to be overturned. More­
over, the narrow construction provided to federal civil rights statutes 
at this time made it very difficult to prosecute law enforcement offi­
cials who used physical violence against black suspects.171 Even in 
those unusual cases where a federal violation could be established, 
convincing all-white southern juries to indict and convict law enforce­
ment officials who had mistreated black defendants proved virtually 
impossible.172 
Finally, even assuming that the number of coerced confessions de­
clined after 1940, it is impossible to say how much Brown was respon­
sible for this development. The sort of law enforcement behavior con­
demned by the Court's ruling appears to have been on the decline 
anyway by the 1930s. The Wickersham Commission Report in 1931 
had noted a decline in the use of extreme physical coercion against 
criminal defendants. Popular revulsion against Nazi and Stalinist law 
enforcement methods further contributed to the demise of such prac­
tices by the mid-1930s, as did the work of the Commission on Inter­
racial Cooperation and other southern liberal organizations that chal­
lenged the most egregious aspects of Jim Crow criminal justice. Law 
enforcement officials continued regularly to employ less extreme 
forms of coercion, such as sleep deprivation, physical isolation, and 
continuous interrogation. Physical torture, however, seems to have 
also Editorial, Rebuke to Torture, 47 THE CRISIS 81 (1940) (calling the torturing of black 
criminal suspects a "routine police procedure" in the South). 
170. See, e.g., To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS 25 (1947). 
171. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); ROBERT K. CARR, FEDERAL 
PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A SWORD 24, 30-31 ,  105-15 (photo. reprint 
1959) (1947); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 170, at 1 14-19. 
172. See, e.g., CARR, supra note 171, at 114, 133-42, 161-62; TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS, 
supra note 170, at 126. 
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been losing favor, independently of the Supreme Court's interven­
tion.113 
Brown thus intervened against a practice that apparently was de­
clining in frequency anyway. It clearly did not eradicate that practice. 
At most, it provided incentives to drive the practice underground. 
And those incentives were relatively weak, since law enforcement of­
ficials engaging in the practice could not be held directly responsible 
for violations, and most cases built upon coerced confessions never 
advanced far enough in the legal system for courts inclined to follow 
Brown's mandate to register their disapproval. For all these reasons, 
Brown was not a decision of dramatic consequence. 
One general reason the criminal procedure cases of the interwar 
period did not have much direct impact was that southern black de­
fendants ordinarily could not get their cases to the Supreme Court. 
Their fate lay in the hands of less sympathetic state courts, which may 
or may not have respected the constitutional rights articulated by the 
Justices. 
Most southern black criminal defendants were impecunious. They 
could not afford the cost of hiring a lawyer for trial, much less the sev­
eral thousand dollars required to finance extensive appellate litiga­
tion.174 The criminal procedure cases that reached the Supreme Court 
were atypical in this regard. The NAACP financed the appellate litiga­
tion in Moore; the ILD in Powell and Norris; and the NAACP, the 
CIC, and the ASWPL in Brown. None of these cases could have got­
ten to the Supreme Court without outside financial assistance. The 
Phillips County race riot and the alleged rapes and ensuing trials at 
Scottsboro captured national attention. Because these criminal cases 
revealed southern Jim Crow at its worst, they provided outstanding 
fundraising opportunities.175 The NAACP and the ILD, respectively, 
became involved at the early stages of litigation and raised large sums 
of money to finance appeals. Brown v. Mississippi was more of a gar­
den variety murder case. Only the extraordinary efforts of local ap­
pointed counsel, who covered some of the legal costs from his own 
173. For the points in this paragraph, see supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text. The 
Court began challenging less extreme forms of coercion in Chambers, 309 U.S. 227 (repeated 
interrogation of isolated prisoner). 
174. One contemporary commentator attributed the relative dearth of Supreme Court 
criminal procedure cases to the expense, which he estimated to exceed $3,500. See NELSON, 
supra note 59, at 45. The NAACP spent roughly $15,000 over three-and-a-half years de­
fending the Phillips County defendants at various levels of the criminal justice system. See 
Walter White, The Defeat of Arkansas Mob Law, 25 THE CRISIS 259 (1923); NAACP, Press 
Release 2 (Sept. 12, 1924), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frames 335-36. The 
Supreme Court appeal alorie in Brown v. Mississippi cost $1,261. See AFRO-AMERICAN 
(Bait., Md.), Feb. 22, 1936, at 1. 
175. On the fundraising opportunities created by Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 
11, at 143-44, 170 n.98; CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 40. On Moore, see KELLOGG, 
supra note 26, at 242-43. 
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pocket, kept the case alive long enough for outside organizations to 
become involved and finance an appeal to the Supreme Court.176 
In the run-of-the-mill criminal case, indigent black defendants 
were represented not by elite legal talent hired by the NAACP or the 
ILD, but rather by court-appointed lawyers. Generally these lawyers 
were white, and they could not always be counted upon to defend ag­
gressively the rights of their black clients, since doing so could be inju­
rious to their careers as well as potentially hazardous to their health.177 
For example, a tacit agreement existed among prosecutors and de­
fense counsel in many southern counties not to raise the issue of black 
exclusion from juries.17s When a white ILD lawyer challenged that 
tacit agreement in a Maryland murder case in 1931, he had to endure 
death threats and subsequent retaliatory disbarment proceedings.179 
The ILD lawyer representing the Scottsboro Boys in their first round 
of retrials, Samuel Leibowitz, was besieged with death threats after he 
questioned in court the honesty of county jury commissioners and of 
the white women who had alleged rape.1so The court-appointed white 
defense attorney in Brown v. Mississippi ruined a promising political 
career by pursuing the case so aggressively.1s1 In the wake of 
Scottsboro, two white ILD lawyers lost their lives for defending three 
blacks charged with raping and killing a white woman in Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama.1s2 
Black lawyers, who possibly would have been more aggressive in 
defending the rights of their clients, were few and far between in the 
South during the interwar period.183 The number of black lawyers in 
Mississippi declined from twenty-one in 1910 to three in 1940, and the 
176. See CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 45-49. 
177. See, e.g., Charles H. Houston, The Need for Negro Lawyers, 4 J. NEGRO EDUC. 49 
(1935); Letter from William Pickens to NAACP (Apr. 11 ,  1926) (describing how white at­
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753; Letter from G.W. Lucas, President, New Orleans Branch of the NAACP, to James 
Welson Johnson, Secretary, NAACP (Apr. 24, 1926) (describing "apprehension" over 
southern white attorney in residential segregation case), microformed on NAACP Papers, 
pt. 5, reel 2, frame 755. On the pressure felt by white lawyers not to represent blacks in con­
troversial cases involving interracial crime, see Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328, 
330 (Ky. 1909); CARTER, supra note 11, at 179; MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 214-17; 
Emanuel, supra note 13, at 237 n.115. 
178. Cilella & Kaplan, supra note 61, at 503 n.17; see also CARTER, supra note 11, at 75. 
179. McGuinn, supra note 137, at 156-57. The Maryland case was Lee v. State, 161 A. 
284 (Md. 1932). 
180. CARTER, supra note 11 ,  at 199-202, 205-10; see also id. at 79-80 (describing threats 
against two other attorneys who questioned the character of the alleged rape victims). 
181. CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 46, 59-60, 105-06, 155-56. 
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183. 1 MYRDAL, supra note 25, at 550; Houston, Negro Lawyers, supra note 177, at 49, 
50 tbl. 1 .  
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number in South Carolina fell from seventeen to five.184 Outside of 
major cities, essentially no black lawyers practiced in the South. Fur­
thermore, the few black lawyers who could be found were a distinct 
liability in most Jim Crow courtrooms, both because of the racial 
prejudice of white judges and jurors and because of the inferior legal 
training most of them had received.185 
The NAACP, to preserve its credibility, was unwilling to become 
involved in criminal cases unless convinced of a high probability of the 
defendant's innocence.186 Moreover, the absence of NAACP branches 
from most of the rural South at this time obstructed the Association's 
participation in cases where the abuses were likely to be greatest at a 
point in the litigation where it could have done the most good - when 
the trial record was being created.187 In any event, NAACP involve­
ment was something of a mixed blessing from the perspective of 
southern black criminal defendants. On the one hand, the organization 
could provide essential financial resources and skilled lawyering. On 
the other hand, its involvement, if publicly known, risked alienating 
local opinion, and thus reduced the chances of a favorable jury verdict, 
appellate reversal, or gubernatorial commutation. 
Frequently, enlistment of competent counsel on appeal came too 
late to do much good, as inept or careless lawyering at trial produced 
procedural defaults that insulated constitutional violations from ap­
pellate review. In Brown v. Mississippi, the coerced confession issue 
nearly failed to gain a hearing in the Supreme Court because defense 
counsel had challenged the voluntariness of the confessions at the 
wrong point of the trial.188 The issue of race discrimination in jury se­
lection was procedurally defaulted in both Moore and Powell and very 
nearly so in Patterson v. Alabama, a companion case to Norris.189 In 
Frank v. Mangum, a procedural default cost the defendant any appel­
late review on the question of whether his absence from the court-
184. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 139, at 130. 
185. On racial bias against black lawyers, see id., and MCMILLEN, supra note 20, at 215. 
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room when the jury verdict was returned violated his due process 
rights.190 Even highly skilled defense counsel, as in Frank, could slip on 
the hazardous terrain of state criminal procedure. Until the Supreme 
Court in the civil rights era changed the rules regarding federal court 
deference to state procedural defaults, many valid federal constitu­
tional claims were denied a hearing in any appellate court.191 
Finally, the Jim Crow system was so broadly and deeply rooted 
that compiling the sort of trial record necessary for effective appellate 
review could be difficult. For example, in Moore v. Dempsey, fear of 
economic and physical retaliation deterred all but a handful of local 
blacks from signing affidavits supporting a change in trial venue. 
When Walter White of the NAACP traveled to Phillips County to in­
vestigate the facts of the case for purposes of litigation, he was nearly 
lynched.192 Similarly, in cases raising the issue of race discrimination in 
jury selection, local blacks who testified regarding their qualifications 
to serve risked retaliation.193 Rigorous cross-examination of white wit­
nesses, especially women in rape cases, not only alienated white jurors 
but also put defense counsel at physical risk.194 The pervasive violence 
of the Jim Crow South could intimidate white witnesses as well as 
black. One of the physicians who testified in the second round of 
Scottsboro trials privately confessed to the judge that he never had 
believed the alleged victims had been raped, but he rejected the 
judge's exhortation to testify publicly to this effect, for fear that he 
would no longer be able to live in that county.195 Ruby Bates, one of 
the two alleged victims in Scottsboro, who recanted her rape allega­
tion in one of the defendants' retrials, refused to return to Alabama 
for subsequent proceedings because of death threats. In all of these 
ways, it was difficult to develop a trial record that would have enabled 
even a sympathetic appellate court to reverse criminal convictions of 
southern black defendants. 
For these various reasons - the inability of most southern black 
defendants to afford counsel, the relative absence of alternative forms 
of legal assistance such as the NAACP, the difficulty of maneuvering 
around state procedural default rules, and the obstacles to compiling a 
favorable trial record - cases such as Moore, Powell, Norris, and 
Brown were the exception rather than the rule. The Supreme Court 
190. 237 U.S. 309, 343 (1915). 
191. For the later change in the rules regarding procedural defaults, see Fay v. Noia, 372 
U.S. 391 (1963), and Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375 (1955). 
192. On Moore and Walter White, see CORTNER, MOB, supra note 10, at 26, 91-92. For 
a similar scenario, see Browder v. Commonwealth, 123 S.W. 328, 330 (Ky. 1909). 
193. See Emanuel, supra note 13, at 240. 
194. On Leibowitz's brutal cross-examination of Victoria Price, see CARTER, supra note 
11, at 205-10, 223-24. 
195. For the rest of this paragraph, see id. at 214-15, 291. 
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probably failed to review other similar cases during this period not be­
cause equally egregious injustices did not exist, but rather because 
those other cases failed to advance sufficiently far in the legal system. 
Many southern black criminal defendants surely were denied their 
constitutional rights without ever receiving a fair opportunity for ap­
pellate review.196 
B. Indirect Effects 
It is possible, however, that these Supreme Court decisions and the 
litigation that produced them were more important for their intangible 
effects: convincing blacks that the racial status quo was not impervious 
to change; educating them about their rights; providing a rallying point 
around which to organize a protest movement; and perhaps even in­
structing oblivious whites as to the egregious nature of Jim Crow con­
ditions. These sorts of intangible consequences of litigation are impos­
sible to measure, but may nonetheless be quite real and possibly even 
substantial. 
A social movement for civil rights faced intimidating obstacles in 
the interwar South. One of the most formidable challenges was simply 
convincing blacks that the status quo of racial subordination and op­
pression was not natural and inevitable, but rather contingent and 
malleable.197 A black correspondent of NAACP Secretary Walter 
White wrote from Louisa County, Virginia, in 1935 that our "worse 
[sic] enemy is ourselves."198 A southern NAACP branch official simi­
larly confided to the national office in 1924 in connection with the 
fight against residential segregation that "it is a very hard matter to 
convince the mass of our people that Segregation is not the best thing 
for us."199 As Walter White explained in a 1937 letter, the greatest dif­
ficulty faced by the NAACP was "getting over to the masses of our 
folks the significance of these fights. "200 Not only did the civil rights 
196. For example, the Supreme Court heard eight coerced confession cases involving 
southern black defendants between 1936 and 1943. See NELSON, supra note 59, at 135-36. 
There cannot possibly have been more coercion during these years than previously. The in­
crease in the number of cases must be attributable to more favorable conditions for obtain­
ing appellate review - a more active NAACP, an increase in the number of black lawyers, a 
more professionalized southern legal system, and less oppressive social conditions. 
197. On the importance of maintaining hope, see DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE 
ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT chs.5-6 (1991); DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL 
PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at 105-06 (1982). 
198. Letter from J. Rice Perkins to Walter White (May 7, 1935), microformed on 
NAACP Papers, pt. 3, ser. A, reel 4, frame 367. 
199. Letter from Jasper E. Gayle, Chairman, New Orleans Branch of the NAACP, to 
Robert W. Bagnall, Director of Branches, NAACP (Nov. 27, 1924), microformed on 
NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 2, frame 645. 
200. Letter from Walter White to Edward S. Lewis, Baltimore Urban League 1 (Sept. 8, 
1937), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 3, ser. A, reel 2, frames 818-19. 
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movement have to overcome black hopelessness and fearfulness, but 
sometimes it was necessary as well to undo the psychological damage 
that the ideology of white supremacy had inflicted on those blacks 
who had internalized its lessons.201 
Litigation, even if it could not "bring on a social revolution,"202 
may have laid the groundwork for future civil rights protest by fur­
thering several distinct objectives. First, litigation taught blacks suf­
fering under the oppressive weight of Jim Crow that they had rights, 
though they must fight for their enforcement. This also was probably 
the main objective of the NAACP's principal political campaign of the 
interwar period - the fight for a federal anti-lynching bill.203 Such 
legislation was unlikely ever to survive a southern Democratic filibus­
ter in the Senate, and in any event probably would have been effec­
tively nullified by recalcitrant southern juries. Still, the fight to secure 
such legislation may have had important motivational and educational 
effects on blacks throughout the United States. An effectively organ­
ized litigation campaign offered similar possibilities.204 The NAACP's 
national office wrote letters to southern blacks informing them of their 
constitutional rights and of the obligation of whites to respect them.205 
Southern black communities sometimes felt so hopeless and friendless 
that for the national office merely to make inquiries on their behalf 
would "do a lot of good."206 The Margold Report, which in 1930 for­
mulated an overall NAACP litigation strategy, stressed that lawsuits 
would "stir . . .  the spirit of revolt among blacks" and cause whites to 
view them with greater respect.207 A 1934 memorandum by Charles 
Houston, then the NAACP's chief lawyer, declared that a principal 
201. On these "internal" obstacles to change, see JOHN w. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE 
OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE 
AMERICAN SOUTH 240-41 (1982); FAIRCLOUGH, supra note 41, at 47-48; KELLOGG, supra 
note 26, at 131; RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN vs. BOARD 
OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 157 (1976); 2 MYRDAL, 
supra note 25, at 758-59, 824-25. 
202. RALPH J. BUNCHE, THE POLITICAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO IN THE AGE OF FDR 
108 (Dewey W. Grantham ed., 1973) (questioning the capacity of litigation to produce racial 
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objective of the litigation campaign should be "to arouse and 
strengthen the will of the local communities to demand and fight for 
their rights. "208 
Many NAACP leaders believed that a litigation campaign was as 
important for its role in organizing local black communities as for the 
victories it produced in court. Lawsuits taught blacks the importance 
of banding together in defense of their rights. What happened to 
Ossian Sweet in Detroit in 1925 or to the Scottsboro Boys in Alabama 
in 1931 could happen to almost any black American at almost any 
time.209 NAACP lawyers such as Charles Houston and Thurgood 
Marshall saw an important part of their job as organizing local com­
munities in support of litigation campaigns. A recent biographer de­
scribes how Marshall frequently was conscripted into making public 
speeches at mass rallies after journeying to southern cities and towns 
for a court appearance. "On occasion," Mark Tushnet writes, Marshall 
"appears to have been brought to town nominally to work on pending 
litigation but actually to rally the troops."210 Houston, in a letter to 
Marshall, referred to himself as "not only lawyer but evangelist and 
stump speaker," and he emphasized the need "to back up our legal ef­
forts with the required public support and social force. "211 Marshall 
and Houston generally took advantage of such speaking opportunities 
to connect a particular legal battle with broader community concerns 
such as voter registration or general political organization.212 
Because these criminal cases demonstrated to blacks the impor­
tance of collective action in defense of their rights, they provided un­
paralleled fundraising and branch-building opportunities for the 
NAACP. The association raised over $70,000 in connection with the 
Sweet case in the 1920s - a small fortune for the NAACP at the 
time.213 Scottsboro provided a similar fundraising bonanza for the 
ILD, as the defendants' mothers undertook northern speaking tours 
208. Memorandum for the Joint Committee of the NAACP and the American Fund for 
Public Service from Charles H. Houston (Oct. 26, 1934), microformed on NAACP PAPERS, 
pt. 3, ser. A, reel 1, frames 859-60. 
209. On Sweet, see Press Release, NAACP, The Sweets with Robert W. Bagnall Tour 5 
Cities (Jan. 15, 1926), microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 3, frame 415; Dr. Sweet, 
FLA. SENTINEL (Jacksonville), Nov. 14, 1925, microformed on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, 
frame 34; A Hopeful Sign, ST. LOUIS ARGUS, Jan. 1, 1926, microformed on NAACP Papers, 
pt. 5, reel 4, frame 210; Sweet Case, Unidentified press clipping, May 29, 1926, microformed 
on NAACP Papers, pt. 5, reel 4, frame 291. On Scottsboro, see CARTER, supra note 11, at 
143-44. 
210. TUSHNET, supra note 151, at 30. 
211. Letter from Charles Hamilton Houston to Thurgood Marshall (Sept. 17, 1936), 
quoted in GENNA RAE MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 145 (1983). 
212. See PATRICIA SULLIVAN, DAYS OF HOPE: RACE AND DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW 
DEAL ERA 83-84, 91-92 (1996). 
213. See Sweet Case, supra note 209. 
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which drew large crowds and raised substantial sums of money. Often 
the initiation of litigation in some southern city or town provided the 
occasion for organizing a new NAACP affiliate. For example, the 
NAACP branch in Meridian, Mississippi, was organized in connection 
with the Brown litigation.214 
Litigation not only taught blacks about their rights and inspired 
them to organize in defense thereof, but it also provided salutary ex­
amples to southern black communities of black accomplishment and 
courage. Observing a skilled black lawyer subjecting a white county 
sheriff to a grueling cross-examination was an important educational 
lesson to southern blacks, who had endured so long the oppressive 
weight of Jim Crow. The bold and capable performance of black law­
yers in southern courtrooms seemed to contravene the very premises 
of white supremacy. Mark Tushnet observes that Thurgood Marshall's 
most important audience on such occasions was neither judge nor jury, 
but rather "the African-American community observing the trial."215 
The NAACP was well aware of the "moral effect" of using black law­
yers.216 For example, Walter White observed in a 1933 letter that the 
use of a black lawyer in the Texas white primary litigation would 
"have an excellent psychological effect upon colored people."217 
Litigation not only energized and educated blacks, but it also may 
have raised the salience of the race issue for whites. Charles Houston 
observed in the mid-1930s that "[t)he truth is there are millions of 
white people who have no real knowledge of the Negro's problems 
and who never give the Negro a serious thought."218 A major challenge 
214. On Meridian, see CORTNER, BROWN, supra note 12, at 72-73. Litigation challeng­
ing residential segregation ordinances proved especially conducive to building new branches 
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for the civil rights movement was simply teaching white Americans 
how egregious black living conditions were under Jim Crow.219 Litiga­
tion helped further that educational process. As Ralph Bunche 
pointed out contemporaneously, " [c]ourt decisions, favorable or unfa­
vorable, serve to dramatize the plight of the race more effectively than 
any other recourse; their propaganda and educative value is great."220 
Walter White went so far as to observe in connection with the Sweet 
trial in 1925 that the NAACP might prefer not to have an early verdict 
directed in the defendants' favor, since finishing the trial would enable 
the Association to complete the job of education, "which gives the 
trial its greatest ultimate value."221 The educational opportunities af­
forded by litigation may have been greatest in these criminal proce­
dure cases, since they revealed Jim Crow at its worst - southern 
blacks, possibly or certainly innocent of any crime, being railroaded to 
the death penalty through farcical trials.222 By publicizing the worst ex­
cesses of Jim Crow, such litigation may have inspired something of a 
backlash against the system as a whole, in the same way that millions 
of white Americans turned against segregation and disfranchisement 
in the 1960s after witnessing the barbarities of the white supremacy 
system on display at Birmingham and Selma.223 If nothing else, Su­
preme Court Justices, confronted with the appalling facts of cases like 
Moore, Powell, Norris, and Brown, may have begun to rethink their 
previously tolerant attitudes toward Jim Crow practices. 
Finally, litigation, when successful, provided blacks with one of the 
few reasons they had before the late 1930s to be optimistic about the 
future. As already noted, one of the most formidable obstacles to the 
creation of a social protest movement under oppressive conditions is 
convincing potential participants that change is possible. As black 
leader Kelly Miller observed in 1935, even if court victories produced 
little con.crete change, they at least "keep open the door of hope to the 
Negro."224 
219. On northern white ignorance of southern black living conditions, see 1 MYRDAL, 
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III. LESSONS 
By situating these interwar criminal procedure decisions in the 
broader context of American constitutional and civil rights history, it 
is possible to draw some tentative lessons regarding the nature and 
consequences of judicial review and the dynamics of racial change in 
American history. For starters, these rulings support the claim made 
by several recent commentators that the Supreme Court's constitu­
tional interventions tend to be less countermajoritarian than is com­
monly supposed.225 The decisions in Moore, Powell, Norris and Brown 
almost certainly were consonant with dominant national opinion at the 
time. Even within the South, significant support existed for the results 
in these cases. As noted earlier, these rulings only bound the southern 
states to abstract norms of behavior that they generally had embraced 
on their own. In the North, meanwhile, although blacks suffered op­
pressive discrimination in housing, employment, and public accommo­
dations, the criminal justice system approached somewhat nearer to 
the ideal of colorblindness. Thus, it is erroneous to conceive of these 
landmark criminal procedure cases as instances of judicial protection 
of minority rights from majoritarian oppression. Rather, they better 
exemplify the paradigm of judicial imposition of a national consensus 
on resistant state outliers (with the qualification that even the south­
ern states generally accepted these norms in the abstract). 
Relatedly, these criminal procedure decisions raise the interesting 
possibility that during the interwar period the Supreme Court re­
flected national opinion on racial issues better than did Congress. 
These rulings imposed constitutional constraints on southern lynch 
law at almost precisely the same time that the national legislature was 
debating the imposition of statutory constraints on lynching. The 
House of Representatives approved anti-lynching bills three times, in 
1922, 1937, and 1940.226 But these measures never survived in the Sen­
ate, mainly because that institution's antimajoritarian filibuster rules 
enabled intensely committed southern Senators (with the aid of some 
largely indifferent westerners) to block passage. Similarly, the House 
approved anti-poll tax bills five times in the 1940s, but they never 
passed the Senate, while the Supreme Court that same decade struck a 
momentous blow for black suffrage by invalidating the white pri-
225. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REV. 577, 
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mary.227 Likewise, three years after the Court decided Brown v. Board 
of Education,228 which according to opinion polls enjoyed the approval 
of roughly half the nation,229 the best Congress could do was to enact a 
civil rights law dealing with the less contentious issue of voting rights 
that was so obviously inefficacious that many black leaders urged 
President Eisenhower to veto it.230 In sum, from the 1920s through the 
1950s, the Supreme Court probably was a better gauge of national 
opinion on race than was a United States Congress in which white su­
premacist southern Democrats enjoyed disproportionate power be­
cause of Senate seniority and filibuster rules.231 
Another important lesson to be derived from considering the in­
terwar criminal procedure decisions against the backdrop of the 
Court's other race-related rulings is that not all Jim Crow measures 
were of a piece. In the 1920s, the Supreme Court unanimously (if indi­
rectly) reaffirmed the constitutionality of public school segregation.232 
In the 1930s, the Court unanimously dismissed constitutional chal­
lenges to the white primary and the poll tax.233 Yet, at the same time 
the Court was legitimizing segregation and black disfranchisement, it 
struck several blows against Jim Crow criminal justice. Apparently the 
Justices thought it was one thing to segregate and disfranchise blacks, 
and quite another to execute possibly innocent black defendants after 
farcical trials. These rulings thus revealed a judicial hierarchy of racial 
values similar to that embraced by most white Americans of the era. 
During the interwar period, very few white southerners (or, for that 
matter, white northerners) evinced disapproval of the segregation and 
disfranchisement of southern blacks.234 Yet many whites, both in the 
North and in the South, were genuinely appalled by the sort of lynch 
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law procedures that the Court's rulings countermanded. These deci­
sions, in short, confirm the hierarchy of racial values famously de­
scribed by Gunnar Myrdal in his American Dilemma. Most whites of 
the period were far more opposed to interracial marriage, school de­
segregation, and black voting than they were committed to executing 
innocent blacks without a fair trial. 
These criminal procedure decisions also lend some support to the 
view of those commentators who have questioned the Court's capacity 
to effectuate significant social change.235 In the face of deeply rooted 
southern mores, these Supreme Court decisions made little practical 
difference to southern blacks enmeshed in the Jim Crow legal system. 
The many mob-dominated trials of the 1930s confirm the limited im­
pact of Moore, and the many tortured confessions of the 1940s confirm 
the limited impact of Brown v. Mississippi. The decision whose effects 
are easiest to measure, and whose potential impact on southern crimi­
nal justice was greatest, was Norris. In those parts of the South most 
intensely resistant to black service on juries, that ruling was defied 
without repercussion for an entire generation. Thus, the criminal pro­
cedure decisions of the interwar period foreshadowed the southern 
white response to Brown v. Board of Education. For an entire decade, 
essentially no school desegregation took place in the South, notwith­
standing that most famous of all Supreme Court interventions against 
Jim Crow.236 
Still, Supreme Court victories can have important indirect effects, 
even if intense resistance frustrates their direct implementation. The 
abominable treatment of black criminal defendants vividly symbolized 
the precarious lives African Americans led in the Jim Crow South. For 
this reason, criminal defense litigation provided outstanding fund­
raising and branch-building opportunities for the NAACP. When in­
nocent men were sentenced to death after farcical trials, no southern 
black man could feel safe. The need for collective action to resist such 
injustice was apparent. Meanwhile, northerners, both white and black, 
frequently were aghast at the sort of egregious injustices that received 
the stamp of state approval in mid-century America. Measuring the 
intangible effects of Supreme Court decisions is virtually impossible. 
Yet, it is plausible to believe that during an era in which black Ameri­
cans had little reason to be optimistic about the possibility of change 
in race relations, a handful of Supreme Court victories may have pro­
vided a slim ray of hope in an otherwise barren landscape. 
Yet the Court's criminal procedure decisions also had an effect on 
white southerners. Reared on hostile memories of federal intervention 
235. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING 
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during the Civil War and Reconstruction, most white southerners 
were viscerally resistant to any federal imperatives regarding race rela­
tions, whether legislative or judicial. Thus, decisions such as Powell v. 
Alabama produced notable backlashes in southern white opinion. The 
more the Supreme Court intervened on behalf of the Scottsboro Boys, 
the more determined white Alabamians seemed to execute them. 
Similarly, the Mississippi Supreme Court clearly retrogressed in 
Brown v. Mississippi, refusing to reverse a conviction based .on a co­
erced confession that it almost certainly would have excluded from 
evidence a decade earlier. A later and more famous Supreme Court 
ruling named Brown is the most dramatic exemplar of this backlash 
potential inherent in High Court decisions. As I have argued else­
where, 237 the most significant effect of Brown v. Board of Education 
may have been neither its educational influence on white northerners 
nor its motivational impact on African Americans, but rather its crys­
tallization of southern white resistance to changes in the racial status 
quo. Brown encouraged a racial extremism that rendered it profitable 
for southern politicians to support, or at least to tolerate, violence 
against peaceful civil rights demonstrators. 
The southern white backlash . produced by Brown v. Board of 
Education ultimately generated its own northern counterbacklash. 
The landmark criminal procedure cases discussed in this Article help 
us to understand this dynamic. From the Civil War through the civil 
rights movement, it has been easiest to mobilize northern white opin­
ion in support of the rights of southern blacks in response to brutality, 
violence, and lynching. When southern whites have quietly segregated 
or disfranchised blacks, northern whites often have remained rela­
tively indifferent. Brutality and violence, though, they sometimes have 
refused to countenance. Thus, during Reconstruction it was the Ku 
Klux Klan violence of the late 1860s that induced a Republican Con­
gress to stretch constitutional boundaries by enacting landmark civil 
rights legislation in 1870 and 1871 .238 The NAACP, appreciating the 
force of this dynamic, made the battle for federal anti-lynching legisla­
tion its first political priority during the period between the world 
wars. The Association recognized that lynching was the easiest issue 
around which to mobilize national opinion in support of federal inter­
vention in southern race relations. Likewise, the criminal procedure 
decisions of this same era confirm that southern lynch law was the 
most appealing racial issue around which to mobilize national judicial 
opinion. After World War II, a resurgence in lynchings, maimings, and 
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race riots prompted President Truman in 1946 to appoint his famous 
civil rights committee, which inaugurated a chain of events culminat­
ing in 1948 in the Democratic Party's adoption of a landmark civil 
rights platform and in President Truman's issuance of executive orders 
desegregating the military and the federal civil service.239 Finally, and 
perhaps most importantly, this same dynamic, by which southern 
white violence against blacks induces a sympathetic northern re­
sponse, accounts for the enactment of landmark civil rights legislation 
in 1964 and 1965, in reaction to televised scenes of brutality inflicted 
on peaceful black demonstrators at Birmingham and Selma.240 Thus, 
the backlash Brown v. Board of Education produced in southern poli­
tics ultimately generated its own counterbacklash, which rendered 
possible the enactment of revolutionary civil rights legislation. Su­
preme Court decisions, it would appear, sometimes have the most un­
predictable of consequences. 
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